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ERISA AND LIABILITY FOR PROVISION OF
MEDICAL INFORMATION
KRISTIN MADISON*

In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, the Supreme Court held that two
individuals' suits against their respective managed care
organizations ("MCOs") for injuries allegedly arising from
coverage denials were completely preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). This decision
may encourage a structural separation between physicians and
MCOs, effectively creating two independent sources of medical
information about a patient's treatment-the physician's
conversation with the patient and the MCO's coverage decision. As
MCOs increase their involvement in creating, evaluating, and
disseminatingmedical information,patients will begin to rely more
heavily on MCOs' provision of medical information. Subjecting
this information provision to standards created by a state tort law
regime would provide an incentive to improve informational
quality. At the same time, retaining ERISA regulation of MCOs'
ultimate coverage decisions would help to preserve the current legal
regime's benefits with respect to regulatory uniformity and cost
control. A bifurcated legal regime would thus reinforce the
movement toward consumer-driven health care.
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INTRODUCTION

In the 2004 case Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,' the Supreme Court
held that two individuals' suits against their respective MCOs for
failure to exercise ordinary care were completely preempted under
the federal ERISA statute, which regulates employee benefit plans.'
The plaintiffs, who alleged that they had suffered injuries as a result
of their MCOs' refusal to cover the care recommended by their
physicians, had sued their MCOs under a Texas statute that imposes
on managed care entities a "duty to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions."3 The Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that the MCOs had made "pure eligibility
1. 542 U.S. 200, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
2. Id. at 2502. "Managed care" refers to a form of health insurance that "attempt[s]
not just to pay for, but also to control the cost of, health care services." BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 567 (5th ed. 2004).
Managed care organizations include health maintenance organizations, preferred provider
organizations, and point-of-service plans. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudenceof
Managed Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV.
457, 459 n.1 (2003). ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon 2004).
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decisions" rather than treatment decisions or "mixed eligibility and

treatment decisions," and that the plaintiffs sought "only to rectify a
wrongful denial of benefits promised under ERISA-regulated plans."4
It then held that the plaintiffs' cause of action was completely
preempted by section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.5 Thus, the Court
dashed MCO enrollee6 advocates' hopes of recovering compensation

under state law for injuries resulting from improper MCO denials of
care.' Because ERISA does not permit consequential damages that
would compensate enrollees for injuries resulting from denied
benefits,'

the Davila holding also precluded the plaintiffs from

obtaining a meaningful remedy under federal law.
The Davila decision is troubling both because it leaves injured
enrollees to bear much of the burden stemming from improper MCO

decisionmaking and because it undermines MCO incentives to
improve the quality of the coverage decisionmaking process. Not
surprisingly, newspaper editorials critical of the result in Davila

(although not necessarily its legal reasoning) appeared soon after the
decision was issued.9 One editorial said that the decision "leaves most
Americans helpless" and "puts the public at the mercy of the
insurance industry."1
A second referred to the "intolerable

4. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2498, 2502.
5. Id.
6. This Article uses the term "enrollee" broadly to apply to any ERISA plan
participant or beneficiary whose benefits depend on medical necessity decisions of the sort
typically made by MCOs. The term therefore includes a plan participant whose employer
self-insures but hires a third party administrator to perform utilization review functions.
For descriptions of the roles of third parties in ERISA plan administration, see Karen A.
Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65
Mo. L. REV. 405, 443-44 (2000); Korobkin, supra note 2, at 486.
7. While the Texas statute at issue in Davila may continue to apply to MCO
enrollees whose health plans are not subject to ERISA regulation (such as those who
purchase coverage individually), many Texans have ERISA-regulated coverage. See TEX.
DEP'T OF INS., HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION IN TEXAS:
THE IMPACT OF
MANDATED HEALTH BENEFITS 38, 41 (1998), available at http://statecoverage.net/pdf/

tx2.pdf (stating that ERISA applies to "virtually all private-sector employee benefit plans"
and estimating that in 1996 over fifty-seven percent of Texans had employment-based
health coverage); see also infra note 31 (documenting the prevalence of ERISA plans).
8. See infra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the remedies available
under ERISA.
9. For a synopsis of selected Davila-related editorials, see Kaiser Daily Health Policy
Report, Editorials Respond to Supreme Court Decision to Limit Lawsuits Against HMOs
in State Courts, June 23, 2004, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm
?hint=3&DRID=24375.
10. Editorial, Where Are Patients' Rights?, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), June 22, 2004, at
6, availableat 2004 WLNR 16170046.
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situation" existing in the wake of Davila." A third called the result

"bad news" for those harmed by health plans' coverage denials and
suggested that the plaintiffs "surely deserved a day in court."'" The
editorials expressed concerns about the lack of MCO accountability
that have long been articulated by health policy analysts, legal
scholars, and judges. 3 They frequently advocated that Congress fill
the ERISA-created regulatory void, n echoing the message of Justice
Ginsburg, who, in a concurring opinion in Davila, urged that

Congress "revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA

regime."' 5 Scholarly commentary on the Davila case highlights
similar themes. 6
11. Editorial, A "Regulatory Vacuum," ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 23, 2004, at
14A, available at 2004 WLNR 3726078.
12. Editorial, A Blow to Health Plan Patients, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A22.
13. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J., concurring) ("ERISA ... creates strong incentives for HMOs to deny claims
in bad faith .... ERISA's remedial scheme gives HMOs every incentive to act in their
own and not in their beneficiaries' best interest."); Peter J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich:
On Peritonitis,Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 767 passim (2001) (analyzing the Supreme Court's Pegram
opinion described infra in Part I and its implications for accountability).
14. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 12 ("[T]he only real remedy may lie with Congress
.... This page has long endorsed a strong patients' rights bill that would allow managed
care plans to be held accountable in state courts."); Editorial, supra note 11 ("[T]he
decision puts the responsibility to fix this intolerable situation where it belongs: on
Congress."); Editorial, supra note 10 ("This ruling should be all the evidence that
Congress should need to put passage of a real Patients Bill of Rights at the top of its
agenda.").
15. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("I also join 'the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court
revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.' ") (citing DiFelice, 346
F.3d at 453 (Becker, J., concurring)). Justice Ginsburg explained that Congress had
intended to incorporate a make-whole standard of relief into ERISA, and that she
"anticipate[d] that Congress, or this Court, will one day-so confirm." Davila, 124 S. Ct. at
2504. In support of the argument that the Supreme Court had previously erred in denying
plaintiffs make-whole relief, the Ginsburg opinion cited John Langbein, What ERISA
Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003). Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503.
16. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Supreme Court's Limitation of Managed-Care
Liability, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1351 (2004) ("Congress should amend ERISA to
ensure that ERISA plans and their MCOs are just as accountable to patients for medical
decisions as physicians are."); Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court and
Health Law: The Year in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528, 531 (2004) (suggesting that
Davila will "create institutional debate, probably result in federal legislative or judicial
action, and possibly produce a very different regime of managed care regulation than the
immediate status quo"); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Leading Cases, 118 HARv. L.
REV 456, 462-63 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases] ("Davila, coupled with ERISA's
limited remedial scheme, leads to a troubling incentive structure in managed care
utilization review ....

Either the judiciary or the legislature must act to correct this

incentive structure."). See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Back to the '90s-The Supreme
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This Article proposes a legal regime that would increase MCO
accountability and provide remedies to some injured enrollees, but at
the same time would preserve the benefits of ERISA, including those
resulting from the Davila decision itself. As several commentators
have recognized, the Davila opinion may affect the structure of health
plan decisionmaking.17 In a previous opinion, the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that MCOs could be held liable under state law
for certain coverage decisions made on their behalf by treating
physicians, 8 while in Davila it determined that MCOs that do not act
through treating physicians receive ERISA-based protection against
such liability. 9 Thus, Davila gives MCOs an incentive to maintain a
functional separation from treating physicians.
If a physician
recommends a proper course of treatment, but the MCO denies
coverage, both will be protected from tort liability-the physician by
compliance with the standard of care, and the MCO by ERISA
preemption.
If Davila results in a greater functional separation of MCO
administration and physician care, it may benefit MCO enrollees by
increasing the information available to patients faced with a
treatment choice. The treating physician is the most obvious source
of medical information for a patient, but not the only one. When an
MCO's coverage determination involves the exercise of medical
judgment, such as in a "medical necessity"-based coverage denial, the
MCO becomes another source of medical information. The MCO
announces its assessment that a treatment is not medically necessary
and describes the medical basis for its decision. Just as treating
physicians influence patients' decisions through the information they
provide as part of the treatment process, MCOs may influence
patients' decisions through the information they provide as part of the
coverage determination process. If changes in the health care
industry expand the role of the MCO as an information provider, and
thus increase MCO influence over patient decisionmaking, it will

Court Immunizes Managed Care, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1277 (2004) (commenting on the
implications of Davila for health plans, patients, and providers); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
The Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits Against Managed Care Organizations,HEALTH AFF.
WEB EXCLUSIVE, Aug. 11, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff
.w4.417v1 (noting that Davila will protect plans from liability related to their utilization
review decisions unless Congress intervenes).
17. See Mariner, supra note 16, at 1350; Ruger, supra note 16, at 530; Leading Cases,
supra note 16, at 462-63.
18. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-37 (2000); infra Part LA (describing
Pegram).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
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become more important to hold MCOs accountable for the quality of
the information they provide, just as physicians are held accountable.
One way to achieve MCO accountability is to eliminate ERISA
preemption of state law as applied to coverage determinations
involving the exercise of medical judgment. This approach would
subject medical necessity determinations to the scrutiny of tort law;
suits like Davila's would be allowed to proceed. For medical
necessity decisions based on purely medical criteria, this may be a
desirable approach.
As numerous scholars have pointed out,
however, medical necessity determinations may reflect resource
allocation decisions as well as the exercise of purely medical
judgment."
This Article proposes a bifurcated regulatory regime
under which only the medical information underlying discretionary
exercises of medical judgment, not resource allocation decisions,
would be subject to challenge under tort law.21 The ultimate coverage
decision, and the process used to reach it, would remain subject to
ERISA's uniform regulatory framework.
Part I of this Article describes managed care organizations, the
nature of litigation against them, and the effects of ERISA
preemption. Part II traces the evolution of the roles of patients,
physicians, and health insurers in the medical decisionmaking process,
and explores the legal implications of this evolution. Part III
considers how two recent trends in health care, an increased focus on
information processing as a means of achieving health care quality
and an increased emphasis on consumer participation in
decisionmaking, might further affect these roles. It explains that both
trends magnify the importance of MCO accountability for
information provision. Part IV proposes that while MCO coverage
denials based on express plan terms or cost-effectiveness
20. See, e.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE
IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 8-10 (2002) (commenting generally on the role of cost
considerations in health plan and physician decisionmaking and noting that health plan
administrators must weigh the impact of medical decisions for individual plan members on
the availability of resources for the treatment of other members); E. HAAVI MORREIM,
HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE 110-16 (2001) (exploring variant definitions
and applications of medical necessity criteria and how they may affect members' access to

services).
21. E. Haavi Morreim has forcefully argued that resource decisions should be subject
to a contract regime, while decisions involving expertise should be subject to a tort regime.
See generally MORREIM, supra note 20. The proposed bifurcated regime is supported by
much of the reasoning that Morreim offers in her thorough analysis of her own proposal.
It differs from Morreim's recommended legal regime, however, in its narrow focus on
ensuring accountability through tort law only for MCOs' provision of medical information.

See infra note 191.
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determinations should continue to be subject to challenge only under
ERISA, the medical information provided as part of the coverage
determination process should be subject to tort suits. It argues that

while the proposed regime would have some drawbacks, it would
benefit patients in the short term by encouraging the dissemination of
high-quality medical information, and in the long term by increasing
awareness of MCO resource allocation decisions. Part V concludes
by pointing out that this proposed bifurcated legal regime's emphasis
on informational quality as a tool for enhanced decisionmaking is
well-suited for an era of consumer-driven health care.22
I. MANAGED CARE LAWSUITS AND

A.

ERISA PREEMPTION

Managed Care and ERISA Before Davila

In the late 1980s and 1990s, millions of Americans enrolled in
which sought to control the costs of care through selective
contracting, negotiated payment rates, provider 'financial incentives,
preauthorization requirements, utilization review, and other
techniques. 24 During this period, the rate of growth in national health
care expenditures slowed dramatically.25 At the same time, however,
MCO enrollees became increasingly wary of the effects of MCOs'
cost-control mechanisms on health care choice and quality.26 While
managed care critics sought legislation to protect enrollees against
MCOs, 23

22. Relative to traditional managed care arrangements, "consumer-driven health
care" features greater choice but increased financial responsibility. See John V. Jacobi,
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531,
543-47, 549-55 (2005) (describing consumer-directed health plans); Jon R. Gabel et al.,
Employers' Contradictory Views About Consumer-Driven Health Care: Results from a
National Survey, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Apr. 21, 2004, http://content
.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.210vl.pdf (defining consumer-driven health care).
See infra Part III.B for further discussion of the recent expansion of the role of the
consumer-enrollee-patient in the health care decisionmaking process.
23. See M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Trends in Managed Careand Managed
Competition, 1993-1997, 18 HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 75, 76 (noting the rapid
growth in managed care enrollment in the late 1980s and 1990s).
24. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Patient Care: What's Wrong with a PatientBill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 228-29 (2000) (listing prevalent managed care practices).
25. See Marquis & Long, supra note 23, at 76; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Troyen
A. Brennan, The Swinging Pendulum: The Supreme Court Reverses Course on ERISA and
Managed Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 451, 451 (2005) (suggesting that
managed care led to a decrease in health care costs).
26. See Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 456, and the sources cited therein (describing
managed care practices and the accompanying backlash).
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practices they believed would erode the quality of care, 7 enrollees
who believed they had been harmed by MCO practices sought
remedies through the legal system.2"
Many enrollees who took the lawsuit route soon found
themselves facing a major roadblock: ERISA. 9 In addition to
regulating pensions, this federal statute regulates employer-sponsored
health benefit plans,3" through which many Americans receive their
health insurance coverage." ERISA was intended both to guarantee
individual beneficiaries the benefits they were promised and to
encourage employers to promise benefits in the first place by
minimizing the burden of administration, particularly for multistate
employers.32 To accomplish these goals simultaneously, ERISA
section 514 expressly preempts state law related to benefit plans (thus
allowing employers to avoid potentially inconsistent regulatory
demands),33 while ERISA section 502(a) provides a comprehensive
federal remedial framework for beneficiaries who are denied benefits
due.34
27. See generally Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failureand the Evolution of
State Regulation of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2002) (describing
managed care regulations).
28. See, e.g., Kesselheim & Brennan, supra note 25, at 453 ("[P]atients brought
increasingly potent suits alleging harm by MCOs for denying them appropriate benefits.").
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). For a description of ERISA's preemptive effects,
see Korobkin, supra note 2, at 466-70. For a discussion of the history of ERISA litigation,
see Jost, supra note 16, at W4-419 to -23.
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (defining "employee benefit plan" as "an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan," and defining an "employee welfare
benefit plan" to include "any plan, fund, or program. .. maintained by an employer... for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ... medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits"); id. § 1003 (defining ERISA's scope of coverage to include any
"employee benefit plan").
31. In 2003, approximately sixty percent of the United States population (and more
than eighty-five percent of the privately-insured population) received insurance coverage
through their employers. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-226, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, 16 (2004), available at http://www
Nationally, more than 140 million people are
.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf.
insured through ERISA plans. Mariner, supranote 16, at 1347.
32. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 464-65 ("The primary purpose of the statute
was to regulate private-sector pension plans at the federal level and thus guarantee the
solvency and integrity of such plans for the benefit of employees .... By federalizing
employee benefits law ... ERISA's drafters sought to provide legal uniformity for
employers that administrate benefit plans. Uniformity was intended to reduce the
administrative cost and inconvenience to multistate employers ... " (citations omitted));
see also infra Part IV.C.2.
33. ERISA § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144.
34. Id. § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). For example, ERISA section 502(a) permits a
beneficiary to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
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While a comprehensive federal remedial framework might at
first seem appealing to enrollees harmed by MCO wrongdoing,
ERISA's remedial and preemption features together have proved a
formidable obstacle to obtaining legal remedies for enrollees' injuries.
In particular, the Supreme Court has established that ERISA'g
remedial framework does not permit consequential or punitive
damages for denied benefits.35 Thus, while an enrollee could sue
under ERISA for an injunction ordering the provision of a benefit, or
for reimbursement for a service financed by the enrollee after
coverage was improperly denied by the plan,36 the same enrollee
could not recover under ERISA for harm caused by the MCO's
improper denial or delay of coverage. For example, the enrollee
could not recover for the increased medical costs or pain and
suffering resulting from the failure to obtain care for which coverage
was denied.
Because of this limitation on remedies available under ERISA,
enrollees have often pursued state law remedies for their injuries.
But soon after filing a suit in state court, they have had to confront
the challenge of shielding themselves from ERISA's powerful
preemptive effects.37 Even if the enrollee-plaintiffs made only state
law claims in their complaint (based on negligence, for example),
defendants would argue based on Supreme Court precedent that the
cause of action was essentially federal in nature, was completely
preempted by ERISA, and was therefore removable to federal
court.38 Courts would often find that a cause of action dependent on
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan." Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
35. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 469 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134 (1985) and Mertens v. Hewett Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993), among other cases,

for the proposition that an employee denied a benefit due may not recover for
consequential or punitive damages); see also John Langbein, What ERISA Means by
"Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 passim (2003) (discussing the cases in which the Supreme Court
determined that ERISA prohibited compensation for consequential injury, and arguing

that the Court's view of ERISA is in error because it fails to account for trust law's
traditional make-whole remedial standard).
36. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2497 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 495-97 (describing tort litigation arising from

utilization review decisions).
38. The Supreme Court has stated:
Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the
scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court
.... Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is
necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of
Congress. It, therefore, 'arise[s] under the ... laws ...of the United States,' 28
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a coverage denial was a claim within the scope of ERISA section

502(a) and therefore completely preempted.39 Because section 502
was intended to serve as the exclusive remedial scheme for all

benefits improperly denied, state attempts to supplement section 502
would be preempted. 4 Given the limits on damages available under
ERISA, plaintiffs would then be left without a viable remedy, and
their claims would be dismissed. 1
Patient advocates looked for a way to work around the

preemption problem. One way was to frame their state law claim not
as a claim based on a denied benefit, but instead as a claim based on
4 2 the plaintiff filed a
poor treatment. In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,

negligence suit against a health maintenance organization ("HMO")
in state court, arguing that it was vicariously liable for poor quality
care provided by physicians and others, and that it was directly liable

for its negligence in selecting providers.43 The HMO removed the
case to federal district court, arguing that the claims were completely

U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b).
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987); see also Davila, 124 S. Ct. at
2494-96 (discussing the complete preemption doctrine).
39. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485, 1488-90
(7th Cir. 1996) (recharacterizing a vicarious liability claim as a denied benefit claim and
finding the claim completely preempted).
40. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,388 (2002) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that ERISA's civil enforcement
provision, § 502. . ., provides the exclusive vehicle for actions asserting a claim for benefits
under health plans governed by ERISA, and therefore that state laws that create
additional remedies are pre-empted."); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
52, 57 (1987) (concluding that a plaintiff's state law claim was preempted under ERISA
section 514(a) based in part on a finding that ERISA section 502(a) was the "exclusive
vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper
processing of a claim for benefits").
41. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 2003)
("Because ... DiFelice's claim that Aetna was negligent in determining that the special
tube was 'medically unnecessary' could have been the subject of a suit under section
502(a) ...

his claim is preempted ....

We will therefore affirm the District Court's

exercise of removal jurisdiction and subsequent dismissal of the claim .... ); Jass, 88 F.3d
at 1485 ("We conclude that Jass' state law negligence claim ... and her vicarious liability
claim ... are within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA and therefore completely preempted
..... The district court also properly dismissed those claims because as written Jass failed
to state a claim for which ERISA provides relief."); see also Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e find that ERISA pre-empts
the Corcorans' tort claim against United and that the Corcorans may not recover damages
for emotional distress under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court [summary judgment for the defendant] is affirmed.").
42. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 352.
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preempted under section 502(a). 44 The Third Circuit held, however,
that the claims were not completely preempted. Because the claims
challenged the quality of care provided and not the quantity of
benefits received, they fell outside of the scope of section 502(a).45
Dukes thus offered hope to MCO enrollees that if their claims
challenged only the quality of care provided, they might be able to
overcome the ERISA preemption hurdle. Overcoming this hurdle
would not be easy, however.
In particular, as the court
acknowledged, it might be difficult to distinguish between the
quantity and quality of benefits provided.4 6
The Supreme Court adopted language echoing that of the Dukes
court in Pegram v. Herdrich,47 a case concerning the nature of ERISA
plans' fiduciary duties.4 8 The plaintiff's appendix ruptured after her
physician, a part owner of her HMO, recommended a test at a distant
location where services would not be available until after a
considerable delay. 9 The plaintiff prevailed on a malpractice claim
against the physician, but also alleged that her HMO had breached its
fiduciary duty under ERISA by instituting financial incentives to limit
care.5" The Court rejected this claim on the ground that the decision
she questioned was not fiduciary in nature.51 In reaching its decision,
the Court distinguished "eligibility decisions," such as whether a plan
covers acupuncture, from "treatment decisions," such as which
treatment would be appropriate for a person with particular
symptoms.,
While the eligibility/treatment distinction sounds much like the
Dukes quantity/quality distinction, the Supreme Court went one step
further than the Dukes court by creating a third category for "mixed
eligibility and treatment" decisions.5 3 Mixed decisions could not
properly be classified as solely "eligibility" or solely "treatment"

44. Id. at 352-53.

45. Id. at 356-57. After finding that the plaintiffs' claims were not completely
preempted, the court instructed the district court to remand the case to the state court.
The Third Circuit left open the possibility, however, that the state court might still find the
plaintiffs' negligence claims preempted under ERISA section 514. See id. at 361.
46. Id. at 358-59.
47. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
48. Id. at 214.
49. See id. at 215 ("Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure at a
local hospital, but decided that Herdrich would have to wait eight more days for an
ultrasound, to be performed at a facility.., more than 50 miles away.").
50. Id. at 215-17.
51. Id. at 237.
52. See id. at 228.
53. See id. at 229.
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decisions because they were in fact both. The decision at issue in
Pegram was such a decision. The physician made a judgment that
immediate treatment was not required, and thus dictated the result
that immediate treatment would not be covered.54 The Court
concluded that mixed decisions were not fiduciary in nature, thus
preventing a flood of fiduciary duty claims
that could have destroyed
55
the incentive-based HMO model of care.
The part of the decision most intriguing for those frustrated with
enrollees' lack of remedies under ERISA, however, was dicta offering
a justification for the Court's refusal to find mixed decisions
fiduciary.56 If mixed decisions were fiduciary and subject to ERISA
claims, then a defendant might try to show that it had fulfilled its
fiduciary duties by demonstrating that it had complied with the
medical standard of care. The ERISA suit would therefore resemble
a traditional malpractice action in state court. The resemblance
would be even more striking if the suit were brought against not just
the HMO, which bears the ultimate responsibility for the mixed
decision, but also the physician-employee who acted as a fiduciary
when making the mixed decision on behalf of the HMO. The
possibility of a physician defendant is troubling because if ERISA
litigation requires scrutiny of a physician's compliance with the
standard of care, ERISA's provisions preempting laws related to
employee benefit plans57 would seem to mandate the preemption of
state malpractice law.58 The Supreme Court also noted, however, that
"in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state regulation,
there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of
congressional purpose."59 By rejecting the argument that mixed
decisions were fiduciary decisions, the Supreme Court avoided the
possibility of this sort of preemption. At the same time, it left open
the possibility that enrollees harmed by an MCO's mixed eligibility
and treatment decision could escape the effects of ERISA
preemption by bringing an action in state court alleging that the
MCO had provided substandard treatment.

54. Id. at 229-30.
55. Id. at 232-34.
56. See id. at 235-37.
57. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
58. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236 ("On its face, federal fiduciary law applying a
malpractice standard would seem to be a prescription for preemption of state malpractice
law, since the new ERISA cause of action would cover the subject of a state-law
malpractice claim.").
59. Id. at 237.
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The Davila Case

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Pegram became the basis for
the appeals court decision that was ultimately reversed by Davila.
The Davila case resulted from the consolidation of the suits of Juan
Davila and Ruby Calad. Davila, who was afflicted with arthritis,
received a prescription for Vioxx from his primary care physician.#
Vioxx has been shown to cause fewer gastrointestinal problems (such
as bleeding) than other painkillers.6 1 The rules of Davila's Aetna
HMO, however, required him to try two alternatives to Vioxx before
it would approve coverage for Vioxx, unless medical necessity
required otherwise.62 After taking one of the alternative painkillers,

60. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2004).
61. See Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1520 passim (2000) (reporting the results of a randomized trial comparing gastrointestinal
events in patients receiving Vioxx to those in patients receiving naproxen (the generic
form of Naprosyn)); Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves New Indication and Label
Changes for the Arthritis Drug, Vioxx (Apr. 11, 2002), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/ANSWERS/2002/ANS01145.html (announcing FDA approval of label text
concerning risk of gastrointestinal events based on the Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes
Research (VIGOR) study). Neither of these documents had been published before the
spring of 2000, when Juan Davila was prescribed Vioxx, Brief of Appellant Juan Davila at
6, Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-10905), and Vioxx had
been approved only the year before, see FDA, DRUG APPROVALS FOR MAY 1999 (June
11, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/da0599.htm.
Researchers and physicians were
generally aware of the potential gastrointestinal benefits of Vioxx before 2000, however.
See, e.g., Michael J. Langman et al., Adverse Upper GastrointestinalEffects of Rofecoxib
Compared with NSAIDs, 282 JAMA 1929, 1931-32 (1999) (finding that Vioxx had fewer
adverse gastrointestinal effects than nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as
ibuprofen). The same comparative study that supported the FDA's approval of label text
concerning the beneficial gastrointestinal effects of Vioxx showed early evidence of
Vioxx's problematic cardiovascular effects; in 2004, after a more definitive study, Merck
withdrew Vioxx from the market. See David H. Solomon & Jerry Avorn, Editorial,
Coxibs, Science, and the Public Trust, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 158, 158 (2005).
While some experts continue to believe that naproxen may present fewer cardiovascular
risks than Vioxx, see, e.g., Bridget M. Kuehn, FDA Panel: Keep Cox-2 Drugs on Market,
293 JAMA 1571, 1571 (2005), recent studies have associated naproxen with cardiovascular
risks, see, e.g., Soren P. Johnsen et al., Risk of Hospitalizationfor Myocardial Infarction
Among Users of Rofecoxib, Celecoxib, and Other NSAIDs, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 978, 983 (2005) (reporting results of a study of the relationship between nonaspirin
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and myocardial infarction). The FDA has become
concerned that the cardiovascular effects of Vioxx may be attributable to a broader class
of drugs that includes naproxen. See Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, Director,
Office of New Drugs, and Paul J. Seligman, Director, Office of Pharmacoepidemiology
and Statistical Science, to Steven Galson, Acting Director, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research 2 (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/NSAID
decisionMemo.pdf.
62. See Aetna's Member Medication Formulary Guide, January 2000, which describes
Aetna's "step-therapy" program:
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Naprosyn, Davila was admitted to a hospital's critical care unit for
bleeding ulcers and internal bleeding.6 3

Like Davila, Calad suffered an injury after her HMO intervened
in her care. Calad was admitted to the hospital for a hysterectomy.
Her physician recommended an extended post-operative hospital
stay, but a CIGNA nurse determined that a one-day stay in the
hospital was sufficient.' Calad was discharged but later readmitted
with complications that allegedly stemmed from her early discharge.65

In both cases, the plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered injury
as a result of MCO actions that conflicted with the recommendations
of their treating physicians. More specifically, the plaintiffs brought
suits under the Texas Health Care Liability Act ("THCLA"), which
established that HMOs had a duty of ordinary care with respect to
health care treatment decisions.66 They argued that their HMOs had
failed to exercise ordinary care in making medical necessity decisions
and that this failure resulted in their injuries.67
The Fifth Circuit relied on the language of Pegram in
determining that Davila's and Calad's claims were not preempted
under ERISA. First, the court determined that the plaintiffs' disputes
involved mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.68 The disputed
HMO actions were not pure eligibility decisions about the availability

of coverage for Vioxx or hospital stays in general; instead, they were
coverage determinations based on the MCOs' judgments about
whether Davila had received the proper medication or whether Calad

If step-therapy applies to your benefit plan, you must try one or more 'prerequisite
therapy' medications before a 'step-therapy' medication will be covered.
However, if it is medically necessary for you to be initially treated with a steptherapy medication, your doctor can contact the Pharmacy Management
Precertification Unit to request coverage as a medical exception.
Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc. at 8, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (No. 02-1845) (citing
Joint Appendix at 34a, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (No. 02-1845)).
63. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
64. Id. at 302.
65. Id.
66. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (Vernon 2004) (effective
Sept. 1, 1997).
Section 88.002(a) states that a "health insurance carrier, health
maintenance organization, or other managed care entity ...has the duty to exercise
ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for
harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary
care."
67. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302-03.
68. Id. at 307.
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had spent enough days in the hospital. 69 The mixed character of the
decisions meant that they could not be fiduciary decisions under the
reasoning of Pegram. As a result, the plaintiffs' claims could not be
preempted under section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, which imposes liability
for breach of fiduciary duty.70 Furthermore, the court determined
that section 502(a)(1)(B), which permits suits to recover benefits due,
had no preemptive effect because the plaintiffs' claims were tort
claims rather than contract claims.7 In addition to citing Dukes for
the proposition that claims against an HMO for failure to exercise
reasonable care were not preempted,72 the court cited Pegram: "[a]ny
doubts we might have [about the conclusion that the THCLA is not
preempted] are eliminated by Pegram's admonition that ERISA
should not be interpreted to preempt state malpractice laws or to
73
create a federal common law of medical malpractice.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision, holding that the plaintiffs' causes of action were
preempted.7 4 The Court explained that "if an individual, at some
point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) and where there is no other independent legal duty that
is implicated by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of
action is completely pre-empted by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 75
While Davila and Calad might have argued that THCLA imposed an
independent legal duty to exercise ordinary care in treatment
decisions, this duty was not truly independent because it applied only
to care covered under plan terms. 76 As a result, the plaintiffs were left

69. Id.
70. See id. at 306-08. ERISA section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), allows civil
actions under § 1109 of the same title, which says in part that "[any person who is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities.., imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach." 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
71. See Roark, 307 F.3d at 308-11.
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), permits suits to recover benefits due, enforce rights, or clarify rights to
future benefits under the terms of a plan.
72. Roark, 307 F.3d at 309-10.
73. Id. at 311.
74. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004) (finding the
plaintiffs' causes of action preempted under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)). The Supreme
Court declined to consider whether the causes of action might also be preempted under
ERISA section 502(a)(2). See id. at 2494 n.1.
75. Id. at 2496.
76. See id. at 2497-98. THCLA provides that the standards imposed under the statute
"create no obligation on the part of the health insurance carrier, health maintenance
organization, or other managed care entity to provide to an insured or enrollee treatment
which is not covered by the health care plan of the entity." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
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with what was effectively a claim alleging wrongful denial of benefits
due under the plan, a claim that falls within the scope of section
502(a)(1)(B). The Court found that it did not matter that the
plaintiffs chose to allege tort claims, or that the remedies they sought
would not be available under ERISA.77 Congress intended to make
ERISA's remedial scheme exclusive, so state causes of action
supplementing
remedies
available
under
ERISA
were
78
impermissible.
The Supreme Court also rejected the use of Pegram's reasoning
in support of a conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims were not
preempted.7 9 It explained that discretionary benefit determinations
under ERISA were fiduciary acts, even if they involved the exercise
of medical judgment.8" The Court clarified that it was not the exercise
of medical judgment in Pegram that meant that the challenged
decision was a mixed eligibility and treatment decision; a decision
involving medical judgment was not the same thing as a treatment
decision." Instead, the decisions in Pegram were "truly 'mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions' "82 because the medical necessity
decisions were "made by the plaintiff's treating physician qua treating
physician and qua benefits administrator."83
By contrast, the
decisions at the heart of the plaintiffs' suits in Davila were made by
their health plans, not by their treating physicians or their physicians'
employer, and therefore could only be eligibility decisions. Because
no treatment decisions were implicated in the Davila or Calad cases,
the reasoning of Pegram did not apply.'
C.

Treatment and Eligibilityin an ERISA Framework

Davila's and Calad's THCLA claims had been premised on the
assertion that their MCOs had made treatment decisions; the duty of
ordinary care imposed by the THCLA applied to "health care
treatment decisions," not eligibility decisions."
In their Supreme
Court brief, Davila and Calad suggested that the impetus for the
CODE ANN. § 88.002(d) (Vernon 2004); see infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the independent legal duty issue.
77. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2498-2500.
78. Id. at 2499-2500.
79. Id. at 2500-02.
80. Id. at 2501-02.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 2502 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,229 (2000)).

83. Id.
84. Id. at 2502.
85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Texas statute was the lack of traditional malpractice protection for "a
patient whose treatment was in practice being shaped, not by his or
her doctor, but by the entity engaging in utilization review. 's6 They
argued that the Texas Legislature intended to address the situation
where "the patient-insured follows the course of treatment chartedand in many instances controlled-by his or her HMO, and the
HMO's decision ends up being a medically imprudent one that causes
significant harm., 8 7 Consistent with this theory, Calad's original
petition to the state court alleged that "[m]edical services were
actually provided to Plaintiffs by the Defendants: they controlled,
influenced, participated in, and made medical necessity decisions
which affected the quality of the diagnosis[,] care, and treatment
provided to Plaintiffs, violating the duty of ordinary care set forth in
' 's
§§ 88.001 and 88.002. 8
In other words, Davila and Calad argued that their health plans
themselves made treatment decisions by influencing the care
provided. The Texas statute contemplates the MCO role as an entity
that influences care: in part, it defines a "health care treatment
decision" as one that "affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or
treatment provided to the plan's insureds or enrollees."8 9 Even if the
MCO did not directly provide care or employ an enrollee's treating
physician, it might become liable under the Texas statute for the care
ultimately provided to the enrollee because of its role in altering that
care.9" In Davila, MCO determinations that the sought-after care was
not medically necessary ultimately resulted in Davila taking Naprosyn
rather than Vioxx and in a shorter hospital stay for Calad. The

86. Brief for Respondents at 4, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (Nos. 02-1845 & 03-83).
87. Id. at 2. During the Supreme Court oral arguments, David C. Mattax, Assistant
Attorney General for Texas, stated that "[t]he reason the Texas statute was passed was
because managed care entities, HMOs and other varieties and forms, had decided to
exercise medical judgment. And it is that duty that the state is regulating." Transcript of
Oral Argument at 39, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (Nos. 02-1845 & 03-83), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/02-1845.pdf.
88. Joint Appendix at 187, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (No. 02-1845).
89. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(5) (Vernon 2004).
90. Under the Texas statute, a "health care treatment decision" is a "determination
made when medical services are actually provided by the health care plan and a decision
which affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment provided to the plan's
insureds and enrollees." Id. The "determination made when medical services are actually
provided by the health care plan" language arguably could be interpreted to require direct
MCO involvement in the provision of care. The proper interpretation of this language is
unclear, however. In particular, it is not clear what it means for a "health care plan" (as
opposed to a "managed care entity," another defined term within the statute, id.
§ 88.001(8)) to "actually provide[]" services. Nor is it clear if this part of the definition is
relevant when an MCO's decision affects the quality of care provided.
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plaintiffs alleged that these changes in their course of treatment,
changes that stemmed from their MCOs' actions, resulted in their
injuries.91
The precise mechanisms by which the medical necessity
determinations might have influenced the plaintiffs' care are
mentioned but not fully explored in the parties' briefs. Davila's
Supreme Court brief argued that after "Aetna insisted, as a medicalnecessity decision, that Davila first receive a generic substitute for
Vioxx .... [H]e could not even get his pharmacy to fill the
prescription [for Vioxx]." This contention, which implies that Aetna
somehow had direct control over whether a prescription issued by
Davila's physician would be filled, was rejected by Aetna; it is not
clear how Aetna could have exercised such control, if Davila had
offered to pay for the Vioxx himself.93 Calad similarly emphasized
her insurer's degree of control: "Ruby Calad was prematurely forced
out of the hospital by CIGNA's discharge nurse...."I
But Calad's arguments also acknowledged the effect of another
factor that influenced her course of treatment:
her financial
condition. Calad's Supreme Court brief alleged that "her financial
condition did not make days of appeal feasible,"9 5 while her petition
stated that she "was unable to incur the expense personally" for an
extension of her hospital stay.96 The Supreme Court oral arguments
also highlighted the role of financial constraints in determining care:
Question: But to say that the plan condemned them to not
using Vioxx is simply not true. All you're talking about here is
money. The claimant didn't want to lay out the additional
money for the Vioxx.
Mr. Young [George P. Young, counsel for respondents Calad
and Davila]: Well, the truth is, Your Honor, that neither of
these claimants would have needed health insurance if they had

91. Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 4-6.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Aetna stated: "Davila remained free to have the Vioxx prescription filled at his
own cxpense... Nothing in the record-or in common sense or experience-suggests that
the pharmacist would not 'fill' (i.e., dispense) a valid prescription provided that Davila
agreed to pay for it ....
" Reply Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc. at 4-5 n.5, Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845).
94. Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 5.
95. Id.
96. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 181.
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the independent means to just whip out a gold card and pay for
the drug.97

Thus, while some of the language in court documents suggests
that the MCOs exercised direct control over their enrollees' course of

treatment, 98 other statements in Calad's brief and the oral arguments
suggest that the real source of the MCOs' influence was the
combination of their denial of coverage and the financial limitations
that precluded or discouraged the plaintiffs from financing their own
care. The plaintiffs wanted to follow their physicians' treatment
advice, but could not. From an ERISA perspective, the trouble with
this scenario is that the plaintiffs' claims depend on the denial of

coverage. Since ERISA is supposed to provide a comprehensive
remedial framework for those improperly denied coverage, it seems
entirely reasonable to conclude that such claims must be preempted
by ERISA.
But what if the MCOs' denial of coverage did not cause the

plaintiffs' injuries? What if MCOs' influence over their enrollees'
treatment were to emanate not from the financial consequences of
their coverage determinations, but instead from their provision of
information to enrollees? The more direct that MCOs' influence over
enrollees becomes-the less that MCOs' influence is mediated

through financial mechanisms or the decisions of contracting
providers-the more that MCOs begin to resemble treating
physicians. The closer the resemblance, the weaker the logic of
Davila (that treating physicians make treatment decisions, but MCOs

do not), and the stronger the justification for treating MCOs like
other health care providers rather than just payers in assessing
liability.

97. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 87, at 25.
98. In addition to the statements implying direct MCO influence, see supra text
accompanying notes 92-94, the plaintiffs argued that the MCOs' control might extend to
affiliated entities: "Through their contracts with providers, HMOs often require that
doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies in their provider networks 'comply' or 'cooperate' with
the HMO's medical necessity decisions .... In many instances the hospital or other
provider may refuse to provide the treatment until the HMO gives the green light .... "
Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 3. It seems unlikely that a provider would refuse
to provide treatment it had previously recommended, however, if a patient were to agree
to fund the care. In such a case, it is once again financial constraints, rather than the
MCO's direct control over treating providers, that influences the patient's course of
treatment.
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1I. PATIENT, PHYSICIAN, AND PLAN ROLES IN THE TREATMENT

PROCESS
A.

Who Makes Treatment Decisions?

To assess the degree of resemblance between MCOs and treating
physicians in their interactions with patients, it is important to
understand the nature of the treatment process. Variations on the
word "treat" appear frequently in court opinions in ERISA health
benefit cases; discussion of "treatment" and "treatment decisions"
proliferated after Pegram.99 The precise definition of these terms,
however, is unclear. A dictionary, for example, defines "treat" as "to
care for or deal with medically or surgically." 1" But what exactly is
involved in "caring for" or "dealing with"?
One way to give more content to the term "treatment" is to
consider the myriad tasks of today's ,treating physician," the
physician who "cares for" or "deals with" a particular patient. When
a patient arrives at a physician's office seeking treatment for a specific
health problem, the physician will collect whatever information may
be necessary, including a description of the nature of the problem and
the patient's medical history. The physician may physically examine
the patient, and then may recommend and/or perform tests to collect
additional information. On the basis of all of the information
collected, the physician may formulate a diagnosis of the patient's
problem. The treating physician may provide information about
potential medical or surgical responses to the health problem,
offering a brief assessment of the merits and drawbacks of each
alternative, and may make a recommendation about the best course
of action. The physician may write a prescription or perform a
surgery.
Throughout this process, physicians exercise medical
judgment, using their medical knowledge and experience to
determine which question to ask, which diagnostic procedure to
order, which step to take during surgery." 1

99. For example, an August 2005 search in Westlaw's ALLFEDS database using the
search terms "ERISA" and "treatment decision" identified eighteen pre-Pegramopinions
containing these terms. In contrast, it identified sixty-three such opinions in the years
following the 2001 Pegram decision.
100. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=
Dictionary&va=treat&x=O&y=0 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).
101. Professor Morreim emphasizes that "the heart and soul of medicine as a learned
profession is judgment," and describes the many actions of physicians that involve medical
judgment. E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practiceand Medical
Malpractice,32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 962 (1999).

2006]

MEDICAL INFORMATION LIABILITY

Yet, by focusing on the tasks of the treating physician, this
description obscures the roles that others, including patients and
health plans, may play in the treatment process as a whole. These
roles, and indeed the treatment process itself, have evolved over time.
In particular, while physicians have always guided the treatment
process, participation of both patients and plans has expanded.
Fifty years ago, insurer involvement in the treatment process was
minimal. The role of the indemnity insurer was often limited to
reimbursing patients for payments the patients had made directly to
their physicians. °2 Insurers generally did not question the nature of
care that had been provided; they simply paid the physician charges
reflected in the claim that had been submitted.'03 Insurers eventually
required that care provided be "medically necessary" to be
reimbursable, but the term had limited practical effect on the course
of treatment, both because many courts interpreted the term to
14
accommodate whatever care the treating physician recommended, 0
and because the determination was made only after the treatment was
provided.0 5
Patients' involvement in determining the course of treatment was
also once quite limited. Patients have always participated in the
treatment process by seeking physicians' medical and surgical services
and following physician advice, but this form of participation does not
necessarily entail significant control over treatment decisionmaking.
Traditionally, physicians tended to give patients little information
about the treatment process, and "were often accused of
paternalism-making decisions on behalf of their patients .... in
the 1970s, however, the development of the doctrine of informed
consent elevated the patient's role. Courts began to require that
physicians provide information about a variety of factors, including
the patient's diagnosis and the nature, purpose, risks, and likely
outcomes of a particular treatment and its feasible alternatives,

102. See Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA
Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731, 735-37 (1999) (describing insurance plans before the
1980s).
103. See MORREIM, supra note 20, at 4 (commenting on reimbursement practices and
the economics of health care between the 1950s and the 1980s).
104. See JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 43 (describing courts' treatment of medical
necessity provisions).
105. See Morreim, supra note 101, at 965-66 n.65 (explaining the differing implications
of prospective and retrospective review for a patient's course of treatment).
106. JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 53; see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW § 6-9, at 311 (2d ed. 2000) ("The function of disclosure historically was to get patients
to agree to what the doctors wanted.").
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before obtaining consent from a patient to perform medical
procedures.1 07

The emergence of the informed consent doctrine highlighted the
role of the physician as information provider and the role of the
patient as decisionmaker. With the information they receive through
the informed consent process, patients can participate in determining
the course of their own care in a much more meaningful way. 1" 8 By

encouraging the dissemination of information, the informed consent
doctrine increases the autonomy of patients. It also introduces a new
perspective on the term "treatment decision," which Pegram and
Davila attribute to physicians (who make "choices about how to go
about diagnosing and treating a patient's condition"'0 9 ) and the

THCLA attributes to MCOs (which make decisions that "affect[] the
quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment provided to the plan's ...
enrollees").110 It is certainly true that physicians regularly exercise

medical judgment during the treatment process without input from
patients (by deciding which questions to ask, which treatment

alternatives to recommend, or which surgical steps to take, for
example), and that MCOs regularly make decisions that affect care

(by denying coverage, for example). But the essence of the notion of
consent is that it is ultimately the patient who makes the treatment
decision; it is the patient who decides whether to pursue a given
course of treatment by following up on a referral, undergoing a
diagnostic test or surgery, taking a drug, or adhering to medical
advice."' The courts' embrace of the informed consent doctrine" 2 has
arguably altered the treatment process by amplifying the importance
of information provision and increasing the likelihood of meaningful

participation by patients.
107. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, § 6-11 (describing factors to be disclosed);
JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 53 (describing the development and application of the

doctrine of informed consent).
108. For a discussion of the theoretical benefits and practical shortcomings of the
informed consent process, see generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent,
103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994). See also Jan Hoffman, Awash in Information, Patients Face a

Lonely, Uncertain Road, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at Al (describing the increase in
information provided to and sought by patients, and the difficulties they face in making
decisions about their own care).
109. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000).
110. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
111. See MORREIM, supra note 20, at 108 (explaining the role of the patient in the
treatment process).
112. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("we now find,
as a part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient, a ...duty of reasonable
disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers inherently and
potentially involved.").
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The growth of managed care in the late 1980s and 1990s further
altered the treatment process by increasing the participation of health
insurers.'
Trying to stem the rapid growth of health care costs,
health care payers adopted a variety of mechanisms designed to
change the way that care was provided. 4 One such mechanism was
utilization review.1 5 No longer willing to pay after the fact for
whatever care a physician deemed appropriate, MCOs began to
actively evaluate medical necessity as a condition of coverage for
care, before the care was provided. The possibility that a plan might
ultimately deny reimbursement for a particular type of care through a
process of retrospective utilization review, forcing patients and/or
physicians to absorb the costs for care that had already been
provided, would naturally tend to deter the provision of the care. The
prospective utilization review methods favored by MCOs would
further strengthen the plans' influence by informing physicians and
patients in advance of treatment about whether reimbursement would
be denied. A patient apprised about the financial consequences of a
medical treatment might choose not to proceed.
While this
"treatment decision" is ultimately made by the patient, not the MCO,
the potential influence of the MCO's refusal to provide financing on
the patient's course of treatment is clear.
When a denial of coverage is based on the exercise of medical
judgment, however, the MCO's influence may extend beyond that
associated with the financing of care. In making determinations of
medical necessity, the MCO evaluates information specific to an
individual patient's condition. According to the Certificate of
Coverage that Aetna provided to Davila, for example, in determining
whether a requested service was medically necessary, the medical
director was supposed to consider not only the opinion of the
patient's physicians, but also information on the patient's health
status, reports in peer-reviewed literature, reports by nationally
recognized health care organizations, professional standards, the
opinions of health professionals, and other relevant information. 6

113. See supra Part I.A.
114. See id.
115. See Shuren, supra note 102, at 737-48 (describing payer cost-containment
techniques and prospective and retrospective utilization review). As used in this Article,
the term "utilization review" refers to the process by which payers (including MCOs)
determine whether to pay for medical services that have been recommended for or
provided to a particular patient. See, e.g., id. at 740 (defining "utilization review" as "the
process whereby patients' needs are evaluated in light of objective criteria to determine
whether to pay for an individual's medical care").
116. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 55.
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Thus, while an MCO utilization reviewer is unlikely to replicate the

myriad tasks of a treating physician-the reviewer may never take the
patient's history, or physically examine the patient, or provide
surgical services-in theory, the reviewer evaluates the patient's need
for care much as a physician would." 7 The recent settlement of a
class action suit by physicians who had contracted with Aetna further
highlights the resemblance between utilization reviewers' and
physicians' tasks by requiring that medical necessity be defined in
part as "health care services that a Physician, exercising prudent
'
clinical judgment, would provide to a patient."118
In other words, the
utilization reviewer is expected to use criteria that would generate a
necessity determination consistent with the result that would be
reached by a physician exercising medical judgment in an individual
patient's case. Ultimately, MCO reviewers and treating physicians
both exercise medical judgment in performing their duties.
B.

The Legal Implications of MCO Influence on the Treatment
Process

Many commentators have suggested that the MCOs' exercise of
medical judgment during the utilization review process should
remove MCOs from the protection of ERISA preemption and subject
them to state tort liability.'1 9 In fact, the pre-Davila Second Circuit
117. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity,
Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53
DUKE L.J. 597, 603 (2003) (describing health plans' varying approaches to coverage
decisions and observing that "[t]hrough both internal discussion and delegation to
physician groups, managed care seems to be evolving a quasi-medical model for what used
to be considered a decision about the business of insurance").
118. Settlement Agreement, by and among Aetna, Inc., The Representative Plaintiffs,
The Signatory Medical Societies and Class Counsel (May 21, 2003), http://www.aetna.com/
legaljissues/pdf documents/settlement.pdf.
119. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed
Care Torts: Achieving Fairnessand Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence,35 HOus. L. REV.
985, 1063-67 (1998) (noting that utilization review requires individualized medical
judgment and proposing a functional analysis-based ERISA preemption framework under
which claims stemming from utilization review decisions would not be preempted); Wendy
K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections on Doctrinal
Boundaries, ParadigmShifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 253, 268
(2001) ("If MCOs do in fact exercise judgment about the appropriate type of care to
provide or who should provide it, they should be held responsible for negligence in
making that determination."). Other commentators have examined the role of medical
decisionmaking in ERISA preemption analysis. See, e.g., Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing
Between Coverage and Treatment Decisions Under ERISA Health Plans: What's Left of
ERISA Preemption?, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1219, 1271 (2001) (arguing that Pegram implied
that plan decisions premised on medical judgment were subject to state law); Jordan,
supra note 6, at 415-32 (explaining the role of medical decisionmaking in benefit
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decision in Cicio v. Does12 1 took just such an approach. 21 The
treating physician in the case had requested HMO approval for a
tandem stem cell transplant for a patient who had blood cancer.
The HMO's medical director initially rejected the request on the basis
that the procedure was experimental or investigational and therefore
not covered.2 3 In response to the treating physician's appeal, the
medical director once again rejected the request, but this time
approved a single stem cell transplant. 124 The patient died soon after
the HMO's decision was issued. 125 The patient's wife brought a
malpractice claim against the HMO in state court, and the defendants
removed to federal court, arguing that the claim was preempted by
ERISA. 26 In analyzing the preemption argument, the court noted
that utilization review involved the exercise of medical judgment, and
that the decisions made could potentially determine the patient's
course of care. 27 Citing Pegram, the court classified the HMO's
decision as a "mixed decision because it allegedly involved both an
exercise of medical judgment and an element of contract
interpretation," and it held that the plaintiff's tort claim was not
28
preempted.
As previously discussed,2 9 the Supreme Court rejected this
reasoning in Davila, and the Second Circuit vacated its opinion soon
after Davila was decided. 3 ° The fact that a medical necessity
determination involved the exercise of medical judgment is irrelevant
to the ERISA analysis when the judgment occurs during the course of
a coverage determination made by the MCO itself. If,
as in Pegram,
the treating physician simultaneously exercises medical judgment and
makes an eligibility decision, then there is a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision, but when the MCO performs similar tasks, there
is only an eligibility decision. 3 ' The Supreme Court cited the dissent
in Cicio in support of this conclusion: "the reasoning of Pegram 'only
determinations and the implications of this role for (pre-Davila) ERISA preemption

analysis).
120. 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated per curiam, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 104.
122. Id. at 87.

123. Id. at 88.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 102, 104.
See supra Part I.B.
Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
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make[s] sense where the underlying negligence also plausibly
constitutes medical maltreatment by a party who can be deemed to be
a treating physician or such a physician's employer.' "132 The dissent
in Cicio had elaborated on this argument by explaining that when the
alleged negligence does not constitute malpractice by a treating
physician, "there is no apparent reason ... for treating the unlawful
coverage decision any differently from any other unlawful coverage
decision that is not based on medical error."' 33
To the extent that claims like those of Davila and Calad stem
from injuries caused by the MCOs' denial of payment, this argument
has considerable appeal. From the perspective of such plaintiffs, the
reason for the denial of payment is completely irrelevant; it is the
denial of payment itself that precludes the access to the services they
need. The reason for an improper denial also has no effect on the
availability (or unavailability) of remedies for the denial under
ERISA.
This does not mean, however, that the reason for denial will
always be irrelevant. MCOs act like treating physicians not only
when they exercise medical judgment in determining what patients
need,3 but also when they communicate their determination to
patients. 3 ' When MCOs deny a claim on the basis of medical
necessity, they provide information to the patient in the form of an
announcement that a particular treatment is not needed. Some
MCOs have acknowledged an informational role. For example, one
plan's documents stated that "[t]he Quality Care Program ...assists
you ...in securing quality medical care .... They do this by
providing you with information which will permit you (in consultation
with your doctor) to evaluate alternatives to surgery and
hospitalization when those alternatives are medically appropriate." 3' 6
The documents also stated that the Quality Care Program "[p]rovides
independent, professional review when surgery or hospitalization is

132. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004) (citing Cicio, 321 F.3d at
109 (Calabresi, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
133. Cicio, 321 F.3d at 109 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
134. Numerous articles have examined the legal debate over whether utilization review
constitutes the practice of medicine. See generally J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization Review
the Practiceof Medicine?, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 431 (1998); David L. Trueman, The Liability
of Medical Directorsfor Utilization Review Decisions,35 J. HEALTH L. 105 (2002).

135. Indeed, Ohio defines the practice of medicine to include "through the use of any
communication

... advis[ing], recommend[ing]

... for compensation ... a drug or

medicine.., or treatment." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.34(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2003).
136. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1992).
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recommended-to assist you in making an enlightened decision
regarding your treatment."13' 7
By providing information in this way, MCOs, like physicians,
may influence patients' treatment decisions. As the doctrine of
informed consent underscores, physicians' communication to patients
about the benefits of treatment is one of the critical components of
the treatment process. Physicians have a duty to comply with a state
standard of care when communicating this information. Why should
a state not be permitted to impose a similar duty on MCOs? 138
Consider the following hypothetical.
A treating physician
recommends a particular surgery and seeks pre-approval as required
from the patient's employer-sponsored managed care plan. The
MCO's medical director determines that the surgery is unnecessary
and communicates her determination to both the patient and
physician, pointing to a decade-old small-scale study that failed to
identify a significant benefit of the surgery. Pursuant to plan terms
that permit but do not require the MCO to deny coverage for
unnecessary procedures, the MCO announces that the surgery will be
covered despite the surgery's lack of proven effect. The patient,
however, decides to abandon the surgery on the basis of the MCO's
unequivocal statement that the surgery is unnecessary. Soon after
refusing the surgery, the patient suffers an injury that several fiveyear-old large-scale studies demonstrate the surgery would likely
have prevented. The patient then sues the MCO in state court,
alleging negligence in its medical necessity determination. What
result?
Although the MCO made an error in the process of coverage
determination, its ultimate decision to grant coverage was not in
error. Unlike Davila,139 the patient would not likely have a claim
within the scope of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), because the plan has

137. Id. at 1324.
138. An exchange during the Davila oral argument before the Supreme Court
highlights the distinction between injuries caused by the necessity determination and
injuries caused by the coverage denial. After David Mattax, the Assistant Attorney
General for Texas, explained the role of MCOs in treatment and coverage decisions, a

Justice said, "[I]t's simply a statement, we will not pay for it .... " Mattax responded,
"Well respectfully the statement is we don't think it's good for you. We don't think this

care is appropriate for your particular situation."
note 87, at 44.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra

139. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2497 (2004) (observing that
Davila and Calad could have funded treatment themselves and then obtained
reimbursement through an action under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)).
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not denied any benefits due.14 ° Perhaps the patient could bring a suit
under ERISA for violation of the plan's fiduciary duty. However, the
very same action that would provide a basis for such a claim-the
poor quality of the MCO's "recommendation" to the patient-could
also conceivably provide a basis for a state tort action against the
MCO. The Supreme Court's logic with respect to treating physicians
in Pegram suggested that such a situation would be problematic,
contributing to its determination that the treating physician's decision
was not fiduciary in character, and therefore not subject to liability
under ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions.'41 The same logic could
apply to MCOs that take on treatment-related tasks by making
medical necessity decisions. Thus, the patient would not likely have
any ERISA claim, and the patient would need to seek a remedy
through a tort claim.
While this hypothetical situation is admittedly unlikely to arise in
practice, it illustrates that if enrollees rely on their MCOs as providers
of information, then it really does matter whether an improper
coverage decision stems from a medical error or from an
administrative error. When an MCO communicates erroneous
medical information, its influence on patients' well-being may extend
beyond that associated with the coverage decision itself. Consider
again the hypothetical, with just two changes to the fact pattern.
First, instead of granting coverage for the surgery, the MCO denies
coverage due to lack of medical necessity. Second, the patient just
happens to be someone sufficiently wealthy to easily finance surgery
after the MCO has denied coverage. Once again, the patient is
injured after refusing the surgery on the basis of the plan's
justification for its medical necessity determination-not the coverage
denial itself-and sues in state court. Should the patient be entitled
to pursue a recovery in tort?
On the one hand, the reasoning of Davila suggests that such a
suit would be preempted. The relationship between the patient and
the MCO was shaped by the terms of the ERISA plan. The patient's
claim emanated from a coverage determination process governed by
ERISA, and were it not for the fact that ERISA mandates disclosure

140. Interestingly, the patient would have no recourse under the THCLA, either, since
an MCO that approves benefits cannot be held liable under the statute. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(c)(2) (Vernon 2004). Note that this feature of the
statute tends to reinforce the conclusion that the statute is aimed primarily at coverage
decisions, rather than treatment decisions.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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of the reasons for a negative benefit determination, 142 the MCO might
have said nothing at all about the efficacy of surgery. Furthermore,
unlike the first version of the hypothetical, the result of the MCO's
faulty determination process was an improper eligibility decision, one
that the enrollee could have forced the MCO to revisit by bringing a
challenge under ERISA. The fact that ERISA supplies no remedy
for the injury that resulted after the patient failed to challenge the
decision or to seek care elsewhere is irrelevant.
On the other hand, ERISA is intended to address the failure of
ERISA plans to allocate their financial resources in accordance with
plan terms, not their failure to provide medical information of
sufficient quality.143 This patient's injury was completely unrelated to
the plan's allocation decision. Just as in the first version of the
hypothetical, the injury stemmed from the MCO's provision of poor
information, not from the coverage determination under the terms of
the plan.1" In fact, the plan's coverage terms are relevant to the
patient's claim only in the sense that the medical necessity criteria
they contain prompted the plan to use medical information in making
an eligibility determination, and to disclose its analysis to the patient.
The patient's claim in this hypothetical, however, would be based not
on whether the plan contains a necessity term, but instead on whether
the statement that the plan has offered-"this surgery has no
significant benefits"-is consistent with the plan's state-imposed duty
of quality information provision.
Perhaps the information duty could be viewed as sufficiently
independent from the plan's terms so as to differentiate this case from
Davila. As described in Part I.B, the Supreme Court held in Davila
that "if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his
claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other
independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's actions,
then the individual's cause of action is completely pre-empted by
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)."' 4 5 The plaintiffs tried to avoid preemption
by arguing that the THCLA created an independent legal duty of
ordinary care in treatment. 4 6 Because the THCLA does not impose
an obligation to provide care outside of the scope of the plan terms,
142. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
144. Note that a finding that the injury did not stem from the coverage decision would
distinguish this case from Davila. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2497 ("It is clear, then, that
respondents complain only about denials of coverage promised under the terms of
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans.").
145. Id. at 2496.
146. See id. at 2497.
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however, a court would need to examine these terms as well as the
substance of the necessity decision to determine whether the MCO
had fulfilled its duty. 14 7 For this reason, the duty could not be
independent of the plan.148

In contrast, the cause of our hypothetical patient's injury is
informational quality, not the plan's terms or the MCO's application
of those terms. Furthermore, the informational quality duty would
apply to all MCOs' interactions with individual enrollees, regardless
of whether the enrollees are insured through an ERISA plan, and

regardless of the other ways in which plan terms might shape those
interactions. Given these differences, perhaps the Davila preemption
analysis would not apply, and enrollees would be permitted to pursue

informational quality-based tort claims. Other aspects of the opinion,
however, suggest that ERISA's preemptive effect is broad and the
"independent legal duty" category narrow, giving substantial reason
to doubt that an informational quality claim would survive ERISA
preemption.149
147. See id. at 2498.
148. See id. The Court also suggested that if the MCO had correctly denied coverage,
it would be the policy's failure to cover the treatment, not the denial of coverage, that
caused the injury. Id. at 2497. If establishing causation requires scrutiny of the ERISA
plan terms, then a court's determination of liability under the THCLA would not be
independent of the plan.
149. For example, the opinion noted that "THCLA liability would exist here only
because of petitioners' administration of ERISA-regulated benefit plans." Id. at 2498. In
the surgery example, information provision liability would exist only because the MCO
communicated information to a specific enrollee, and the only reason that the MCO
communicated with the enrollee was that it made a medical necessity-based denial in the
course of administering the enrollee's ERISA-regulated benefit plan. In addition, Davila
cited United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that the Labor Management Relations Act preempted a claim by survivors of deceased
miners against a union they alleged had been negligent in inspecting a mine. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372 (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court had
reasoned that it was "not faced with looking at the Collective Bargaining Agreement to
determine whether it imposes some new duty upon the union-rather it is conceded that
the union undertook to inspect and, thus, the issue is solely whether that inspection was
negligently performed under traditional Idaho tort law." Id. at 367-68 (citing Rawson v.
United Steelworkers, 770 P.2d 794, 796 (Idaho 1988)). Similarly, the argument that the
information duty is independent is that the plan undertook to provide information
supporting its decision, and the issue is whether that information was negligently offered,
as determined by state law. In rejecting the Idaho Supreme Court's approach, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that duty did not apply to all who inspected mines or protect all who
might be injured. Id. at 367. Rather, the duty arose from a collective bargaining
agreement defining the relationship between the parties. Similarly, just as malpractice law
generally applies only when a physician has established a relationship with a patient, see
FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, § 6-1, the information duty applies only when the MCO
has established a relationship with an enrollee. It is not a duty that anyone who provides
medical information owes to society as a whole. If the fact that the relationship is created
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Regardless of the answer a full ERISA preemption analysis
would yield, a policy analysis suggests that the answer to this question
should be that claims based on deficiencies in the medical information
generated as part of the coverage determination process are subject
to state tort law and not preempted, while the ultimate coverage
determination itself is subject to suit only under ERISA. The
remainder of this Article explores the benefits of adopting such a
policy proposal. This proposal in some ways resembles previous
efforts to define the scope of ERISA preemption narrowly. Several
commentators have suggested that MCO coverage determinations
involving the exercise of medical judgment should be regulated by
tort law rather than ERISA.15 ° Recent congressional bills, too, have
proposed a legal regime in which ERISA would not preempt state
law allowing recovery of damages resulting from "medically
reviewable" decisions, such as benefit denials based on medical
appropriateness.'
This Article's proposal also identifies a particular
MCO function that should be governed by a state regulatory regime
rather than a federal one. Yet the function it identifies is different.
The proposal would not permit states to regulate the coverage
decision. Instead, it would permit states to regulate the provision of

by an ERISA plan is enough to result in preemption, then no malpractice-like claim
against an MCO by an ERISA plan beneficiary can survive preemption. (On the other
hand, the Supreme Court also observed that the Idaho Supreme Court had
"acknowledged that the Union's representatives were participating in the inspection
process pursuant to the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, and that the
agreement determined the nature and scope of the Union's duty," Rawson, 495 U.S. at
371, suggesting that the analysis may depend on the degree to which the ERISA plan, as
opposed to state tort law, determines the nature and scope of the plan's informational
duties.) Note that this discussion by no means exhausts potential preemption issues. For
example, the fact that the MCO provided information in the course of claim
administration would also tend to support a finding of preemption under ERISA section
514. See, e.g., Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2002)
(finding that state law claims arising out of the dissemination of an employee's medical
information "would be 'related to' the ERISA plan under § 514 and would therefore be
preempted" if the company disseminating the information had obtained it "in the course
of processing a benefits claim or in the course of performing any of its administrative
duties under the plan"). A full ERISA preemption analysis of the proposed regime is
beyond the scope of this Article.
150. See supra note 119; cf MORREIM, supra note 20, at 121-25 (arguing that health
plans sometimes practice medicine and that when they do, they should be subject to
medical malpractice liability).
151. Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 2259, 109th Cong. §§ 104(d)(2),
402(b)(2) (2005). Although the bill permits state causes of action to proceed, it limits the
award of punitive damages. Id. The Senate has previously considered similar bills. See,
e.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2004, S. 2083, 108th Cong. §§ 104(d)(2),
402(b)(2) (2004).
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medical information produced as a byproduct of the coverage
determination process.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF TAILORING PREEMPTION FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE

Two recent developments in the health care world underscore
the importance of fashioning an appropriate regulatory regime to
govern MCOs' provision of medical information. First, as explained
in Part III.A, health insurers have become increasingly involved in
the collection and processing of medical information, partly in an
attempt to improve the qualiiy of medical care. Second, as explained
in Part III.B, new forms of health plans have begun to shift more
decisionmaking responsibility to patients, increasing their need for
medical information.
A.

The IncreasingMCO Role as a Medical InformationProvider

In theory, the primary goal of health maintenance organizations
should be to "maintain" the "health" of their enrollees. In practice,
this health maintenance function was largely pushed aside in the
1990s as managed care entities focused on controlling medical care
costs. 15 2 Recently, however, there has been a resurgence in MCO
involvement in health promotion activities.
This increased
involvement probably stems in part from MCOs' technological
capabilities and in part from changes in the nature of the practice of
medicine. Increasing emphasis on the practice of evidence-based
medicine and the rapid proliferation of new treatment technologies
together place a premium on the ability to collect, process, and
synthesize large amounts of information.15 3 Often large institutions

152. On MCOs' previous focus on costs and renewed focus on the nature of care
provided, see, for example, Glen P. Mays et al., Managed Care Rebound? Recent Changes
in Health Plans' Cost Containment Strategies, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Aug. 11,
2004, at W4-427, W4-433, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.427vl
(commenting that health plans have designed new payment systems "as replacements for
capitated provider payment methods that had been used previously in HMOs" and noting
that "[w]hereas capitation was used primarily as a cost containment strategy, these new
incentives are being used to address cost and quality issues").
153. Evidence-based medicine has been defined as "the conscientious, explicit, and
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients." David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't,
312 BMJ 71 (1996); see also Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The
Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 327, 327-28
(2001) (citing this definition and describing the use of large databases to support evidencebased medicine).
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with sophisticated data management systems already in place, MCOs
tend to be well-suited to take on such tasks.
For example, Aetna, CIGNA, and other health care plans have
established a partnership with the federal Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality to improve data collection with respect to race
and ethnicity, with the goal of finding ways to reduce disparities in the
provision of health care.154 UnitedHealth Group recently announced
that it would make available claims data for millions of patients in
order to facilitate research on potential drug complications. 55 Once it
has data on at least one thousand patients taking a particular drug, it
plans to compare claims of these patients against the claims of other
patients taking similar drugs, in order to identify any problematic side
effects.156 UnitedHealth Group and several other organizations have
contracted with the FDA to provide patient records that can be used
to conduct drug safety analyses. 57 Medicare also has proposed
supplying its claims data to the FDA to improve monitoring of
pharmaceuticals.15 8
While these information-gathering projects are in their early
stages, in the past, health plans have acted on the information they
have collected. For example, Kaiser Permanente worked with the
FDA to study the risk of myocardial infarction associated with COX2 drugs (such as Vioxx) and non-selective non-steroidal antiinflammatory drugs (such as naproxen). The preliminary results of
154. Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Major Health Plans
and Organizations Join AHRQ to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care
(Dec. 14, 2004), availableat http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2004/dispcolpr.htm.

155. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Early-Warning Tool for Unsafe Drugs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2005, at D4. This innovation raises the possibility that while MCOs and other entities with
superior access to claims databases may be well-suited to process information, they are not
the only entities that could do so. MCOs could in theory limit their functions to claims
processing and simply turn their claims data over to other experts (such as university
researchers, government entities, or physician organizations) for analysis, evaluation, and
communication of the results. The examples reviewed in this section, however, suggest
that MCOs have for now chosen to take a more active role in reviewing claims and other
information and communicating this information to their enrollees.
156. Id.
157. See David Phelps, FDA Turns to Industry To Help Track Drug Safety,
Effectiveness, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 29, 2005, at 1D (reporting that the

FDA selected UnitedHealth Group, the Kaiser Foundation Research Institute, Vanderbilt
University, and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care "to help it monitor drug effectiveness and
safety by sifting through large computerized volumes of patient records").
158. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Medicare's Will May Be FDA's Way, L.A. TIMES,
June 5, 2005, at Al. For an analysis of how Medicare records might be used to monitor
the effects of "high-risk medical devices," see generally David J. Malenka et al.,
Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices Using Medicare Claims, 24 HEALTH AFF.

928 (2005).
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this study, released in the months prior to the withdrawal of Vioxx,
contributed to concerns about the drug's safety.15 9 Kaiser limited its
use of Vioxx more than a year before the drug was withdrawn,
because its evidence-based reviews indicated that Vioxx did not work
better than older pain relievers for many patients.1 60 As MCOs and
other health care payers become more active in collecting and
examining information, they will become more likely to use this
information in their coverage determination process, and to
communicate their findings to physicians and patients.
Medicare
has
expressly
acknowledged
the
potential
informational benefits of the data-gathering process underlying some
of its financial coverage decisions. In particular, it has begun to tie
coverage decisions for certain items and services to the systematic
collection of data showing the health effects of these items and
services. Medicare has justified this approach in part by explaining
that it would generate evidence that would
assist doctors and patients in better understanding the risks,
benefits and costs of alternative diagnostic and treatment
options ....
These additional data may alter the course of
patient treatment based on the best available evidence, and
may lead a physician to reconsider the use of the item or service
or otherwise alter a patient's
management plan, potentially
16 1
improving health outcomes.
The more that information gathered pursuant to payer operations
influences patient treatment, the more important payer accountability
for the dissemination of that information becomes.
Recent trends in quality reporting may increase pressure on
MCOs to influence the treatment process through any available
mechanism, including information dissemination.
Greater

159. See Hearingon FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting PatientSafety First? Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sandra Kweder, Deputy Director of
the Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S Food and Drug
Administration), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/111804
sktest.pdf. The Vioxx study, released on September 30, 2004, is available at http://
www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/vioxxgraham.pdf.
160. See Barry Meier, Doctors, Too, Ask: Is This Drug Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2004, at C1. The Mayo Clinic and the Department of Veteran Affairs similarly limited the
use of Vioxx. See id.
161. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: FACTORS
CMS CONSIDERS IN MAKING A DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE
DEVELOPMENT 4 (2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/coverage/download/

guidanceced.pdf.

2006]

MEDICAL INFORMATION LIABILITY

technological capabilities increase both MCOs' ability to monitor the
quality of care delivered to enrollees, and enrollees' ability to monitor
the quality of their MCOs. The National Committee for Quality
Assurance ("NCQA"), a health plan accreditation organization,
issues report cards on health plans. 16 The reported scores reflect not
only enrollee satisfaction with plan administration, but also objective
measures of clinical quality, such as whether enrollees have received
recommended preventive care such as immunizations or
mammograms, or whether enrollees who have suffered from heart
attacks have received beta blocker drugs. 163 To the extent that MCOs
are regularly evaluated on measures of the quality of care received by
enrollees, they have an incentive to influence the treatment of
enrollees. In other words, MCOs have both the ability to use
information to improve the treatment of their enrollees, and the
reason to do so.
The expansion of MCOs' involvement in collecting, evaluating,
and disseminating medical information, both in generalized form and
as applied to specific patients, demonstrates that MCOs are capable
of serving as information providers to their health plan enrollees.
Some plans already provide information to enrollees outside of the
coverage decision context. CIGNA, for example, recently introduced
a website that not only allows enrollees to compare pharmaceutical
prices, but also notifies them of potentially problematic interactions
between medications."6 Furthermore, some MCOs have begun to
provide information to enrollees through disease management
programs, particularly for chronic health conditions such as
congestive heart failure and diabetes.1 65 As more enrollees come to
162.

See NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH PLAN REPORT CARD,

http://hprc.ncqa.org/index.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).
163. See NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH PLAN REPORT CARDLIVING WITH ILLNESS, http://hprc.ncqa.org/living.asp (describing NCQA's criteria for the
"Living With Illness" health plan grade) (last visited Dec. 5, 2005); NAT'L COMM. FOR
QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH PLAN REPORT CARD-STAYING HEALTHY,
http://hprc.ncqa.org/stayinghealthy.asp (describing the NCQA's criteria for the "Staying
Healthy" health plan grade) (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).
164. See Cigna Offers Its Customers Drug Data, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 24, 2005,
available at http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050824[BUSINESS/
508240384&SearchlD=73218346172234; see also Press Release, CIGNA, CIGNA
Pharmacy Management Makes It Easier for Consumers to Comparison Shop for
Prescription Drugs, Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news/
indexmail.shtml?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/08-23-2005/0004092803&EDATE=
(announcing new web pharmacy tools).
165. Typical components of such programs include educating patients about treatment
plans, monitoring patients' symptoms and treatment, and coordinating care across
multiple providers. See Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-431 to -32; see also CONG.
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recognize their MCOs' involvement in such functions, they may begin
to rely more on their MCOs as independent sources of information.
Enrollees may also begin to rely less on their treating physicians.

Treating physicians will always play a critical role in the treatment
process because so much of the practice of medicine requires
professional judgment and personal interaction with patients. At the

same time, the increasing complexity and rapid expansion of our
knowledge about medicine poses a considerable challenge to
physicians, particularly generalist physicians.'6 6
Extensive data

comparing the actual provision of care to current medical standards
demonstrates that patients do not always receive high-quality care.'6 7
A recent study reviewing medical records, for example, found that
patients had received less than sixty percent of recommended care as
determined by expert panels based on national treatment guidelines
and the medical literature. 6 8 Although the discrepancy should not be
attributed solely to the actions of physicians, these data suggest that

there may be a role for outside intervention in the treatment process.

BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT

PROGRAMS 2-3 (Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5909/10-

13-DiseaseMngmnt.pdf (describing disease management programs). MCOs have also
become involved in patient care indirectly by developing and disseminating practice
guidelines to physicians.
CORONARY
GUIDELINES

See, e.g., KAISER PERMANENTE'S CARE MGMT. INST.
ARTERY
DISEASE
GUIDELINES
WORKGROUP,
EVIDENCE-BASED
AND TECHNICAL REVIEW FOR THE SECONDARY PREVENTION OF

CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE (rev. 2004), http://members.kaiserpermanente.org/kpweb/

pdf/feature/247clinicalpracguide/CMI CADGuidelines-publicweblO2604.pdf (providing
treatment guidelines for cardiac care).
166. See, e.g., John Z. Ayanian et al., Knowledge and Practices of Generalist and
Specialist Physicians Regarding Drug Therapy for Acute MyocardialInfarction, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1136, 1136 (1994) (finding that cardiologists were more likely than family
practitioners to report prescribing certain drugs that had been shown to be associated with

improved survival and suggesting that differential knowledge about clinical trials may
have contributed to this result). For a general evaluation of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of generalists and specialists in providing high-quality care, see Martin T.
Donohoe, Comparing Generalist and Specialty Care: Discrepancies, Deficiencies, and
Excesses, 158 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1596, 1596-1608 (1998). See also E. Haavi
Morreim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional Medicine,
and the Standards of Science, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 224-26 (2003) (reviewing
evidence on the disconnect between clinical practice and medical science and observing
that rapid change in medicine, among other factors, impedes efforts to address this
disconnect).
167. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 166, at 225 & nn.36-45 (providing examples of
studies documenting overprovision and underprovision of medical care).
168. Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the
United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003).
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Through use of their expertise, MCOs could potentially improve the
quality of care received by patients.169
The physicians of both Calad and Davila allegedly recommended
a course of care that the MCO declined to recognize as medically

necessary. 70 In many such cases, it will be natural for patients to want
to follow the course of care recommended by their treating
physicians. First, MCOs may have a financial incentive to decline to
cover recommended care. As long as benefit denials do not lead to a
net increase in health care costs during the enrollee's coverage
period, 7 ' MCOs may benefit financially from denials.172 To the
extent that physicians are paid for each service they deliver, rather
than a fixed amount per patient, they do not face a similar financial
incentive to limit care.'73 As a result, patients concerned about the
underprovision of care will tend to be less skeptical of their
physicians' advice than their MCO's advice. 74 Second, patients know

that their physicians have personally examined them, while the MCO
and its utilization reviewers have not. To the extent that physicians
possess more information about patients than MCOs do, patients are
169. For a similar argument that independent external review mechanisms could
improve patient treatment through the provision of information, see Sage, supra note 117,
at 623 (arguing that American medicine "suffers from widespread inconsistencies in
practice that compromise safety and quality," and that independent review can "bring the
best scientific evidence to bear" and could "take seriously the obligation to educate health
plans and physicians as well as assure optimal treatment for individual patients").
170. See supra Part I.B; see also Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir.
2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (describing the
recommendations of Calad's and Davila's physicians, the MCOs' refusal of coverage, and
Calad's and Davila's allegations that their MCOs "had failed to use ordinary care in
making medical necessity decisions").
171. Denials may increase health care costs by causing injuries that require further
treatment.
172. More specifically, the entity financially responsible for funding the care (possibly
the employer) would benefit from denials. Of course, MCOs may refrain from denying
claims if they believe that denials will harm their reputation and result in a loss of
profitable customers.
173. In the past, many MCOs used a payment system known as "capitation," under
which they paid certain physicians a fixed fee per enrollee for a fixed period of time (such
as a month), rather than paying for each service provided. See Mark A. Hall, Rationing
Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 758-79 (1994) (defining capitation and
discussing its implications). Because the fee did not depend on the number of services
provided, physicians compensated on a capitated basis, like MCOs, faced a financial
incentive to limit the care provided. In recent years, however, the use of capitation has
declined, so that physicians are more likely to be paid for each service they provide. See
Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-430 (reporting that many health plans abandoned
capitated payment arrangements in 2000 and 2001 in favor of fee-for-service systems).
174. On the other hand, if physicians are paid for each service they provide, patients
concerned about overprovision of care have reason to be skeptical about their physicians'
advice.
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likely to rely more heavily on their physicians' judgment. Third, trust
is an important part of physician-patient interactions, and patients
will tend to trust physicians to recommend appropriate care. Still, the
more that enrollees perceive MCOs to be engaged in activities related
to medical information and the provision of care, rather than just the
processing of claims, the more likely they will take seriously the
information provided by their MCOs. 175
B.

The IncreasingPatientRole as a Medical Information User

The likelihood that enrollees will actively evaluate the
information provided by MCOs is enhanced by a second, very recent
trend in the health care world: the increasing role of patients in
choosing the level of care that they receive. Rapid increases in health
care expenditures and health plan premiums have prompted
employers and MCOs to redesign health plans to place a larger
fraction of the cost burden on enrollees. 17 6 One approach has been to
increase deductibles significantly, which from employers' perspectives
has the dual cost-saving effect (at least in the short term) of shifting
costs from the plan to the enrollee and discouraging the enrollee from
using care. Under a "consumer-directed" health plan, for example,
enrollees would have relatively unfettered control over the care they
receive and the identity of the providers from whom they receive it.
The plan might have a very high deductible, however, perhaps $2,000;
even if the employer were to create an account to cover some
expenditures, enrollees would likely bear a significant proportion of
1 77
the cost burden associated with the treatment decisions they make.
The recent creation of Health Savings Accounts ("HSAs"), which
"combine[] a tax-free account to pay for medical expenses with a
high-deductible health plan with low premiums,"'7 8 will undoubtedly
reinforce the trend toward high-deductible plans. Fifty insurers have
175. Direct informational influence on an enrollee's decisionmaking has been alleged
in at least one case involving utilization review: "[the enrollee's surgeon] alleged that [the
insurance company medical director's] decision caused [the enrollee] to question [the
surgeon's] professional judgment and to waver in her decision to proceed with surgery that
was not covered by insurance." Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 533 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1997).
176. See Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-433.
177. See Anne K. Gauthier & Carolyn M. Clancy, Consumer-Driven Health CareBeyond Rhetoric with Research and Experience, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1049, 1049
(2004) (defining consumer-driven health care); Shari Roan, More Choice, at a Cost:
Consumer-Directed Health Plans Give Patients Freedom to Choose-and a Larger Bill,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at F1 (describing consumer-directed health plans).
178. Louise Story, Health-Savings Accounts Gain Momentum, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
2004, at D2.
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already introduced high-deductible health policies in anticipation of
the spread of HSAs' 7 9
Another new health plan feature combining increased consumer
choice with increased cost-sharing is provider "tiering." One of the
reasons for the managed care backlash was the limited size of MCOs'
provider networks."' 0
By channeling their enrollees to fewer
providers, MCOs were able to negotiate lower payment rates. But
consumers wanted to keep their previous physicians and receive
services at their preferred hospitals, so MCOs loosened restrictions
on providers. The tiering model is a compromise between this postbacklash open network model and the pre-backlash closed network
model. Health plans place hospitals and physicians into tiers based
on the cost as well as the quality of the care they provide. Enrollees
are free to choose their providers, but face copayments or deductibles
that differ depending on the tier of the provider they choose.'
Pharmaceutical coverage, too, may be tiered, with different levels of
copayments depending on whether the drug is generic or branded,
and the price of the brand.8 2
High-deductible/HSA and tiered-design health plan features
impose a considerable burden on consumers. While fully insured
enrollees have little reason to be concerned about the cost of the care
they receive, enrollees who must pay for a significant proportion of
care directly will want to be informed of the cost of a proposed course
of treatment. Health plans are currently developing tools that will
assist enrollees in determining costs. 8 3 Enrollees will also want to
understand the likely health consequences of a proposed course of
treatment so that they may make an informed decision about whether
the treatment is cost-justified.

179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice and the Managed Care
Backlash, 27 AM. J.L. & MED 1, 1, 8 (2001) (hypothesizing that the managed care backlash

was related to consumer choice and concluding based on an empirical analysis that "one
approach to reducing the backlash against HMOs ought to include policies that encourage
employers to offer a choice of plans, including a wide-access plan, to their employees").
181. See Robert Steinbrook, The Cost of Admission-Tiered Copayments for Hospital
Use, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2539, 2539-40 (2004); Robert Kazel, Aetna Targets Costs,
Expands Tiered Network of Specialists, AM. MED. NEWS, July 26, 2004; James C.
Robinson, Hospital Tiers in Health Insurance: Balancing Consumer Choice with Financial
Incentives, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Mar. 19, 2003, at W3-135, W3-135 to -139,

http://hpm.berkeley.edu/pdfs/hospital%20tiers.pdf.
182. Barbara Martinez, Drug Co-Pays Hit $100, WALL ST. J., June 28,2005, at D1.
183. See Sarah Rubenstein, Patients Paying for Medical Care Struggle To Divine the

Costs, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.wsj.com (subscription service).
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health

plans thus

represents another step in the evolution of the plan-patient-physician
relationship, one that will greatly enhance enrollees' demand for

information. Enrollees with financial responsibility for their own
treatment will likely collect relevant information from a variety of
sources. Enrollees faced with claim denials, for example, may need to
decide whether to use money in an HSA to purchase care directly.

Their decisions may turn on the information they receive from their
treating physicians, their health plans, the Internet, and other sources.
Admittedly, if devices such as HSAs or tiers prove to be successful in

limiting the growth in health care costs without sacrificing quality,
they may eventually reduce the prevalence of utilization review,

decreasing the information that MCOs provide as part of the benefit
determination process.M Some scholars have argued, however, that
HSAs and managed care may ultimately coexist and may even

generate synergies that benefit patients. 185 In the meantime, they
create a climate that encourages enrollees to seek out regularly any

information

that is

available

with respect

to

recommended

treatments, including information provided by their MCOs.

186

The

fact that information provision is likely to become a significant
component of consumer-directed health plans is an important reason

to start defining standards with respect to MCO information
provision.

184. Even if consumer-directed health insurance reduces the use of traditional forms of
utilization review, however, it may promote information provision in conjunction with
other financing arrangements, such as tiering. Along these lines, Professor Sage has
suggested that "[n]ecessity-based exclusions in health insurance ... should be reoriented
to influence consumer decisionmaking directly" by "factorfing] medical necessity into a
system of graduated cost-sharing" based on cost-effectiveness. Sage, supra note 117, at
639.
185. See Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health
Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1490 (2005) ("HSAs and managed care are not
antithetical, however, and are already being integrated by health plans to create synergies
that should benefit consumers and bring new cost-consciousness and discipline to the
health care marketplace."); see also id. at 1497-98 (discussing the continued relevance of
coverage decisions within an HSA framework). Hall and Havighurst conclude that the
"consumer-directed movement's greatest contribution may be to make it finally clear to
the public at large that health plans' coverage decisions differ... from treatment decisions
and that benefit administration is an essential part of a larger process by which people
make choices about spending." Id. at 1498-99.
186. See, e.g., Jon B. Christianson et al., Consumer Experiences in a Consumer-Driven
Health Plan, 349 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1123, 1126 (2004) (describing the informational
features of consumer-driven health plans, including Internet-based access to measures of
physician qualifications and hospital performance and "educational resources ... relating
to health promotion, disease management, and general medical information").
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Thus, with each additional task that health plans have taken onfirst simply financing care, then managing costs based in part on
medical judgment, and now managing quality more directly-they
have become a more significant source of medical information for
patients. With each additional task that patients have taken on-first
complying with a prescribed course of care, then helping to determine
that course of care under the doctrine of informed consent, and now
weighing cost, quality, and convenience in selecting a course of caretheir reliance on medical information has grown. Together, these
changes make it imperative that MCOs be held accountable for the
quality of information that they provide.
C.

Information Benefits of the Post-DavilaERISA Regime

The post-Davila ERISA regime ultimately may increase the
information available to patients. It is true that Davila undermines
the goal of accountability by precluding the application of state law in
an environment in which ERISA offers no meaningful remedy.
Under Davila, if an MCO does not delegate coverage decisions to
treating physicians, its coverage decisions are subject to challenge
only under the ERISA regime. As the Fifth Circuit commented
before the Davila decision, "HMO's [sic] can escape all liability if
they instruct their doctors to recommend every possible treatment
and leave the real decision to HMO administrators."1" 7 Plans that
want the protection of ERISA preemption will therefore be careful to
ensure that the coverage determination process remains separate
from the treating physician's interaction with the patient.
From the patient's perspective, the effect of the separation is the
creation of two potentially independent sources of information: the
treating physician and the MCO. When the physician recommends a
treatment for which the MCO denies coverage on the basis of lack of
medical necessity (or other medical criteria), the patient can resolve
the conflict in information provision in several ways. First, the
patient may pursue internal appeals, or, in some cases, seek an
independent external review; many states have mandated that
medical necessity-based HMO coverage decisions be subject to
review by an independent party.18 8 Second, the patient may seek
187. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
188. See, e.g., Aaron Seth Kesselheim, What's the Appeal? Trying To ControlManaged
Care Medical Necessity Through a System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 873,

886-91 (2001) (describing the external review process); Korobkin, supra note 2, at 507
(stating that at least forty-one states mandate external review); see also Rush Prudential
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additional information from his or her treating physicians, or third
parties, and decide to finance the recommended care him or herself.
In either case, if there is room for legitimate disagreement over
medical necessity, the patient may ultimately make a less informed
decision when the treating physician makes both coverage and
treatment decisions than when the treating physician makes only
treatment recommendations and the MCO makes eligibility decisions.
This is true regardless of whether the treating physician ultimately
approves or declines coverage. If the treating physician were to make
a mixed decision recommending treatment, for example, the patient
might never become aware of any doubt about medical necessity.
Alternatively, a treating physician closely affiliated with an MCO may
face a Pegram-like financial incentive to deny coverage, perhaps a
stronger financial incentive than a typical non-affiliated physician.
The physician may then fail to recommend care initially, leaving the
patient unaware of at least a potentially beneficial treatment option.
Thus, if Davila encourages MCOs to retain the responsibility for
coverage decisions while preserving the independence of treating
physicians, Davila may ultimately increase the availability of
information to enrollees.
If the enrollee uses the additional
information gathered to choose the best possible course of treatment,
clinically speaking, the enrollee will be less likely to need the
remedies of the tort system, because physical injury will be less likely
to occur. If the initial MCO coverage denial were faulty, an enrollee
could pursue treatment based on the physician's recommendation and
then seek compensation for that care through the ERISA regime,
either prospectively, or, if the enrollee finances treatment him- or
herself, retrospectively.
Enrollees would be uninjured and
indemnified, while MCOs would be held accountable for poor-quality
coverage decisions.
If the post-Davila regime achieved its full potential, there would
be little need to consider a change in the law. The regime faces
significant obstacles, however, including several raised by the Davila
case. For example, patient-enrollees may be unable to finance care
themselves. If they are also unable to finance prospective litigation to
obtain treatment, not an unrealistic assumption, the MCO coverage
decision will essentially be determinative. In addition, for an enrollee
like Calad who is very ill, navigating the appeals process within the
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002) (holding that an Illinois statute mandating
independent medical review of HMO benefit denials was not ERISA preempted). But see
Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r of Haw., 100 P.3d 952, 954 (Haw. 2004)
(holding that the Hawaii external review statute was ERISA preempted).
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timeframe dictated by the enrollee's medical needs will be very
difficult.'89 These obstacles, while real and important, are not the
focus of this Article.
Instead, this Article focuses on another potential impediment to
achieving the full potential benefit of the post-Davila regime:
information of substandard quality. If enrollees are unable or
unwilling to seek a third opinion, but have sufficient funds to finance
their own care, they must weigh the information they have been given
by the treating physician against the information given by the MCO
in determining whether to pursue treatment. While many patients
are likely to follow the recommendation of their physicians, others
will follow the recommendation of their MCOs. For reasons
discussed in Parts III.A and III.B, patient reliance on MCOs for the
provision of information is likely to be greater in the future than it
was in the past. MCOs have become increasingly involved in
collecting and disseminating information related to the quality of
care, while at the same time patients are being asked to take on more
responsibility in determining the course of their own care. If an MCO
is incorrect in its determination of medical necessity, however, a
patient choosing a course of care based on that determination will
likely be harmed. The current ERISA regime's limitation on the
award of consequential damages would preclude a remedy for this
harm. By combining a tort regime with an ERISA regime we can
increase the likelihood that the patient will be compensated and,
through tort remedies' incentive effects, reduce the likelihood that
injury will occur in the first place.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A BIFURCATED LEGAL REGIME
A.

Enhancing ERISA with Liability for Information Provision

The challenge is to shape a bifurcated legal regime that would
take advantage of the strengths of both ERISA and the tort system
while containing their weaknesses. One option is to take the route
rejected by Davila as a matter of current law but considered by
Congress as a matter of future law: to allow medical necessity-based
coverage decisions to be subject to tort law. 90 The analysis in this
Article lends support to such an approach. The expansion in MCOs'
actual and potential roles as providers of medical information
189. See, e.g., Mariner, supra note 16, at 1349-50 (noting the difficulty of pursuing
claims while ill).
190. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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enhances the importance of accountability for actions that convey

medical information, and liability for coverage decisions based on
medical criteria is one means of achieving accountability. This is not
the only possible approach, however.1 9'

Consider the following

proposal.
MCOs can make coverage decisions in an individual case in
several ways. One way is to apply clearly defined, contractually
specified criteria to a disease or condition identified by a treating

physician, or to the procedure, equipment, drug, or other treatment
recommended by the treating physician."
So, for example, if a
contract specifically excludes coverage for bariatric surgery, then,
regardless of any offered medical justification, the MCO could
properly refuse to approve reimbursement for it.'93 Alternatively, the

191. E. Haavi Morreim has proposed a different sort of bifurcated regime: she would
subject MCOs' (and physicians') breaches of expertise to tort law, and "breaches of
resource duties" to contract law. See MORREIM, supra note 20, at 11; see also supra note
21. While Professor Morreim's analysis does not focus on ERISA, she does consider the
potential implications of her analysis for ERISA preemption. MORREIM, supra note 20, at
160-83. Writing before Davila, she notes the existing similarities between the courts'
quality-quantity distinction and her expertise-resource distinction. She then argues that a
full adoption of the expertise-resource analysis would make the courts' ERISA
preemption analysis more coherent. Id. at 162-63. While this Article's information
provision duty would arguably fall within Morreim's expertise category, and coverage
determinations would often fall within Morreim's resource category, the two bifurcated
ERISA regimes would nonetheless differ in important ways. The expertise category, for
example, extends far beyond information provision, encompassing "business and
administrative activities," among others. Id. at 143. It would therefore alter existing law
to a greater extent than the regime proposed here, harnessing the benefits of tort law, but
sacrificing some of the flexibility and uniformity benefits of ERISA.
192. Health plans decline coverage requests for a variety of reasons. A study of nearly
150,000 coverage requests made in 1997 through 1999 to a California medical group that
had taken on responsibility for utilization review showed that 10% of all coverage
requests, and 6% of prospective coverage requests, had been denied. Of the denied
prospective requests, 42% were denied because they were not for a contractually covered
service, and 22% were denied because of the identity of the provider selected by the
enrollee. Kanika Kapur et al., Managing Care: Utilization Review in Action at Two
Capitated Medical Groups, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-275, W3-275 to -280
(2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.275vl.
193. Insurers' flexibility with respect to the breadth of coverage may be limited by state
law. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-839 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring MCOs and other'insurers to cover surgical treatment of obesity under certain
circumstances); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727-32, 758 (1985)
(describing mandated benefit laws generally, and holding that a Massachusetts statute
requiring inclusion of mental health benefits in insurance policies was not preempted by
ERISA). But see infra note 294 (explaining that ERISA preempts such state mandates
with respect to self-insured ERISA plans). On bariatric surgery, see generally Mark A.
Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduction Surgery, 53
DUKE L.J. 653 (2004). Hall reports that plans have taken a variety of approaches with
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contract could specify that all bariatric surgery recommended by a
treating physician is covered if the patient's body mass index ("BMI")
is greater than forty. A claim for bariatric surgery under either of
these rules would generate the sort of "yes-or-no" coverage decision
identified as a pure eligibility decision in the Pegramcase.
Under the proposed bifurcated legal regime, such a coverage
decision would be treated just as it is now: as an eligibility decision
governed by ERISA. The eligibility decision has been effectively
predetermined by the plan terms. The plan terms reflect the
judgment of the plan creators about how best to allocate plan
resources among plan beneficiaries.
An employer might have
decided to favor coverage for one type of procedure (acupuncture,
for example), but only by sacrificing coverage for another (bariatric
surgery for enrollees with BMIs under forty). Thus, the coverage
determination conveys little or no medical information to an
individual enrollee; it indicates only that the creator of the plan, for
whatever reason, has decided not to fund the care. This resource
allocation decision is precisely the sort of decision traditionally made
by trustees and those who create trusts. Thus, its fit with ERISA,
which is based on trust law, is a natural one.
A second type of coverage decision involves an exercise of
judgment by the MCO.'94 While the MCO administrator's decision
may be influenced by internal guidelines, the decision with respect to
a given case might not be dictated by specific contractual terms. So,
for example, the contractual terms might say nothing at all about
bariatric surgery, but may say that the plan covers only care that is
"medically necessary.""19 In determining whether bariatric surgery
fulfills the necessity criterion, the MCO must exercise its medical
judgment. Perhaps in its judgment, bariatric surgery is a cosmetic
procedure that is never medically necessary. Alternatively, it might
use internal guidelines to determine that surgery is not medically
respect to coverage of weight-reduction surgery, including excluding it from coverage
entirely, and specifying coverage criteria in the plan terms. Id. at 662.
194. MCOs sometimes delegate the coverage decision to another entity, such as a
physician group. See, e.g., Sage, supra note. 117, at 609 (noting that "[i]ncreasingly,
preauthorization is delegated by contract to medical groups and other provider
organizations"). If so, the same bifurcated legal regime should apply to this entity.
195. A study of utilization review by a medical group found that twenty-nine percent of
prospectively denied benefits were denied on the basis of lack of medical necessity. See
Kapur et al., supra note 192, at W3-280. For an excellent discussion of the issues
surrounding the definition and application of medical necessity criteria, see AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS ASS'N, PUBLIC INTEREST COLLOQUIUM, MEDICAL NECESSITY: CURRENT
CONCERNS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES passim (2005), available at http://www.health
lawyers.org/docs/pubs/Colloq05.pdf.
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necessary unless the patient has a BMI of more than forty. Or the
MCO might leave the judgment of necessity entirely to the discretion
of its medical director or other utilization reviewer, who would decide
how much weight to give the BMI criterion in the medical necessity
determination on a case-by-case basis.
When the MCO's exercise of judgment involves the evaluation of
medical criteria, it necessarily communicates medical information to
the individual enrollee that has made the claim. The determination
that recommended care is not medically necessary-or for that
matter, that it is medically necessary-announces in a broad sense
whether recommended care is needed. But the exact content of the
information conveyed will depend on the meaning of "medically
necessary." Some enrollees will undoubtedly interpret a negative
MCO determination to mean that a recommended treatment would
not be medically beneficia1 9 6 -that bariatric surgery has no medical
benefit197-but enrollees who read their plan terms more carefully
may realize that in reality the message is more complicated.
Some health plans leave the term "medically necessary" or
"medical necessity" completely undefined.19 Others use definitions
that suggest that the MCO should consider only the criteria a
physician would consider in recommending care; such definitions may
consist "merely of a reference to the standards of the medical
'
community."199
More generally, common contractually-specified
criteria of medical necessity include whether the intervention is in
accordance with community or national standards, whether it is
consistent with accepted principles of medical practice, and whether
the treating physician believes it should be provided.2 00 To the extent
that physicians base their decisions on purely medical criteria, the
resulting MCO determination would communicate only medical
information. Similarly, a medical necessity definition based solely on
the existence of scientific evidence showing improvement in health

196. For an example where it was argued that an MCO necessity determination caused
a patient to question the need for surgery, see supra note 175.
197. Cf. Sage, supra note 117, at 601 ("To many physicians, the phrase 'not medically

necessary' means 'not clinically indicated'.....
198. Hall, supra note 193, at 665.
199. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES:

PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS

INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 126 (1995).

200. CTR. FOR HEALTH POL'Y, STANFORD UNIV., STATE-BY-STATE COMPENDIUM
OF MEDICAL NECESSITY REGULATION, SURVEY OF STATE MANAGED CARE
REGULATORS 15 (2001), http://www.hcfo.net/pdf/stanford.pdf.
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outcomes 2 1 would generate a determination that was purely medical
innature.
To find a service or supply medically necessary, the Aetna
contract at issue in the Davila case required in part that it "be care or
treatment as likely to produce a significant positive outcome as, and
no more likely to produce a negative outcome than, any alternative
service or supply. '20 2 To be considered medically necessary, a
diagnostic procedure must have been "indicated by the health status
of the Member and be as likely to result in information that could
affect the course of treatment as, and no more likely to produce20' a3
negative outcome than, any alternative service or supply."
Moreover, the contract stated that in determining medical necessity,
the director was to consider, in addition to the enrollee's health
condition, peer-reviewed medical literature, national guidelines,
professional standards, the opinion of professionals in the relevant
specialty, and the opinion of the attending physicians.20 4 To the
extent that these sources consider only the medical consequences of
medical interventions, a coverage determination based on such
criteria would convey purely medical information.
In some cases, however, the term "medical necessity" may reflect
more than just an assessment of the medical benefits of a proposed
treatment, or a balancing of the medical benefits and risks of a
treatment relative to alternatives.
It may also incorporate a
consideration of cost. 205 Some plans incorporate cost considerations
obliquely, using terms such as "a prudent use of plan resources" or
the "most appropriate level of service. ' 2 6 Other contract terms
incorporate cost more explicitly. They may define an intervention as
medically necessary in part based on whether it is "furnished in the
most cost-effective manner that may be provided safely and
effectively," whether "[t]here is no other equally effective course of
treatment available which is less costly," or perhaps even whether
"benefits and harms relative to costs for the treatment represent an
201. See id.
202. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 54.
203. Id. at 54-55.
204. Id. at 55.
205. See, e.g., Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Determinations-A
Continuing HealthcarePolicy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH LAW 599, 601 (2004) ("Historically
...the individual's treating physician decided what services were 'medically necessary.'
As these ...plans confronted high-cost new technology and burgeoning total costs,
however, they have sought to narrow the concept of 'medical necessity' . . . to incorporate
an element of cost-effectiveness.")
206. Sara J. Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, Prospectsfor Improved Decision Making
About Medical Necessity, 20 HEALTH AFF. 200, 202 (2001).
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economically efficient use of resources for patients with this condition
compared to alternative treatments."2 7 The Aetna contract at issue
in Davila incorporated cost-related considerations in its definition of
"medically necessary": "To be Medically Necessary, the service or
supply must:... as to diagnosis, care and treatment be no more costly
(taking into account all health expenses incurred in connection with
any equally effective service or supply in
the service or supply) than
20
meeting the above tests.
Thus, a determination that a particular service is not medically
necessary may reflect not just an assessment of the medical
advantages and drawbacks of the proposed intervention, but also its
costs. In other words, medical necessity decisions may embody not
just a judgment about the likely health effects of a treatment, but also
a decision about how a plan's resources should be spent. Ideally, a
bifurcated legal regime would distinguish between the medical
assessment and resource allocation components of the decision. As in
the pure coverage decision case, the resource allocation decision
would be subject to review under ERISA. The medical assessment
portion of the decision, however, should be subject to a state legal
regime, just as a treating physician's medical assessment and
recommendation would. The challenge is to separate the two
components.
It is possible that the MCO itself would distinguish the medical
information component of the decision from the cost-based
component of the decision. In particular, the MCO can separately
identify each portion by explaining the medical evidence underlying
its decision and then rendering the actual coverage decision. So, for
example, in response to a treating physician's recommendation of
Vioxx, an MCO might have said, "Vioxx is as likely to produce a
significant positive outcome as, and no more likely to produce a
negative outcome than, alternative medications. However, because
in meeting this test, and is less costly, we
naproxen is equally effective
' 20 9
decline to cover Vioxx.
In this example, the MCO's ultimate refusal to cover Vioxx
would be subject to challenge only under ERISA. If the enrollee
decided to take the Vioxx anyway, then the enrollee could challenge
207. CTR. FOR HEALTH POL'Y, supra note 200, at 19.
208. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 55.
209. I make no claims as to the accuracy of these statements; on the status of Vioxx at
the time this Article was written, see supra note 61. See infra note 210 on the potential

consequences under the proposed legal regime of an overly sanguine assessment of the
effects of a recommended treatment.
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the benefit determination component of the decision under ERISA to
210
obtain funding for the Vioxx.
If the enrollee chose to take naproxen, however, then the
enrollee should be entitled to sue the MCO for any resulting injury in
state court.211 More specifically, the MCO's statement about the
relative effectiveness of Vioxx and naproxen should be subject to
challenge under tort law. The enrollee should be entitled to rely on
this information as a reasonably accurate summary of medical
evidence. If (a) the enrollee chose to take naproxen because of this
statement or the supporting evidence provided, (b) naproxen was
significantly more likely to produce a negative outcome than Vioxx,
(c) the MCO should have known and communicated this fact to the
enrollee (or at least, not communicated the opposite), and (d) the
enrollee's injury was proximately caused by the use of naproxen, then
the enrollee should be able to bring a state law claim against the
MCO to receive compensation for his or her injuries.
It is also possible that the MCO would choose not to specify the
medical basis for its ultimate coverage decision. In the Cicio case, for
example, the initial denial of the treating physician's request for
coverage "stat[ed] only that the procedure sought was 'not a covered
benefit according to this member's plan which states [that]
procedures are not covered.' "212
experimental/investigational
Similarly, a plan might state simply that an intervention is not
medically necessary, and that therefore coverage is denied.
Observers have commented that in the past plans frequently offered

210. If the enrollee were injured after taking Vioxx, then under the proposed
bifurcated regime, the enrollee might instead bring an action under state law for poor
quality information provision. For example, an enrollee might allege that the MCO's
positive assessment of the effects of Vioxx prompted the enrollee to take the drug, and
that the drug caused a heart attack. If a court were to accept these arguments, and to
determine that the MCO's statement that Vioxx "was no more likely to produce a
negative outcome than" alternatives was inconsistent with the standard of care, then it
would hold the MCO liable for the harm the enrollee suffered. It might be difficult,
however, for the enrollee to convince the court that it was the MCO's information (rather
than the treating physician's) that led to the enrollee's treatment choice.
211. More precisely, under the proposed regime, the enrollee should be able to sue the
entity that provided the substandard-quality medical information. Thus, if a third-party
administrator were responsible for supplying the beneficiary of a self-insured ERISA plan
with medical information supporting a negative benefit determination, the beneficiary
should be able to sue the administrator. Cf. Jordan, supra note 6, at 444 (arguing that the
proper defendant in a tort suit stemming from a "negligent medical determination" could
be the third party administrator or other entity responsible for utilization review services).
212. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004)
(per curiam).
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little reasoning for their decisions.2 13 Given that many enrollees
would naturally assume such a statement to mean that the MCO had
decided that the procedure would not benefit them, state courts
should be entitled to treat the determination as a statement to that
effect. MCOs wanting to avoid this presumption could do so by
providing more specific information about the medical basis for their
decision.
The likelihood that ERISA plans would issue such a sparse
determination, however, has been significantly diminished by the
most recent Department of Labor regulations, which were intended
in part to improve enrollees' access to information."'
These
regulations require the plan administrator to notify claimants of
adverse benefit determinations.2" 5 The notification must include the
"specific reason or reasons for the adverse determination," and
"[r]eference to the specific plan provisions on which the
' The plan must also disclose
determination is based."216
upon request
any "internal rule, guideline, protocol, or other similar criterion"
relied upon.2 17 Most importantly, if the determination is based on
medical necessity or experimental treatment status, the plan must
provide "an explanation of the scientific or clinical judgment for the
determination, applying the terms of the plan to the claimant's
medical circumstances, or a statement that such explanation will be
'
provided free of charge upon request."218
These basic rules will
simplify enrollees' and courts' tasks of separating the medical
information underlying coverage decisions from the resource-based
choices underlying coverage decisions. Once separated, the medical
information alone would be subject to public scrutiny under a tort
regime.
In the Vioxx hypothetical discussed earlier, as in Davila's and
Calad's experiences, the MCO denied a claim for treatment that a
treating physician had recommended. The bifurcated liability regime
protects an enrollee who decides not to pursue treatment as a result

213. See Rules and Regulations for Administration and Enforcement of Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,251 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560) ("Commenters asserted that the reasons given in these
circumstances were frequently 'cursory' and 'vague and open ended.'... The Department
agrees that claimants would benefit from receiving fuller explanations when a claim is
denied because the care is not medically necessary .....
214. See id. at 70,246.
215. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1) (2004).
216. Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(i)-(ii).
217. Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(v)(A).
218. Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(v)(B).
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of the information provided by the MCO. In most cases, however,
the MCO will approve treatment that a treating physician has
recommended.2 9 Such cases raise the question of whether the MCO
could be held liable for information provided pursuant to a coverage
approval. In particular, if a physician makes an inappropriate
recommendation of treatment that the MCO then covers, an injured
enrollee may wish to sue a. deep-pocketed MCO in addition to the
physician, on the theory that by covering the care, the MCO implicitly
conveyed the information that the care was medically necessary.22 °
The frequency with which such situations occur would be limited
by MCOs' financial incentives, which would discourage them from
approving costly but ineffective or harmful treatments. MCOs may
have a financial incentive to approve a substandard recommended
treatment, however, when an alternative is more costly. Moreover,
MCOs might simply improperly evaluate available medical evidence,
resulting in an improper approval of recommended treatment.
Alternatively, MCOs may choose to approve a request rather than
risk resistance from the recommending physician or patient (even if
that resistance is ill-informed). Recognizing claims against MCOs
that approve coverage in such situations might benefit enrollees by
encouraging MCOs to scrutinize treatment recommendations more
carefully.
On the other hand, it would be difficult for the enrollee to
prevail in such a suit, because the enrollee would have to show that
the information provided through the MCO's coverage determination
(and not just the treating physician's recommendation) was the
proximate cause of the patient's injury, despite the fact that the MCO
likely gave no detailed information in support of its decision.
(ERISA regulations do not require MCOs to provide information in
support of positive benefit determinations.) 22' The MCO might also
be able to avoid this form of liability if plans give it discretion (rather
than imposing an obligation) to deny care that it deems medically
219. See Kapur et al., supra note 192, at W3-276 (reporting that previous studies
showed low coverage denial rates); id. at W3-277 (finding that two groups contracting with
health plans to make coverage decisions had denied eight and ten percent of coverage
requests, respectively).
220. But see Mark A. Hall & Gail Agrawal, The Impact of State Managed Care Liability
Statutes, 22 HEALTH AFF. 138, 143 (2003) (noting that adding a deep-pocketed health plan
may increase the cost and complexity of litigation and that plaintiffs may prefer to sue
only providers).
221. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1) (requiring the plan administrator to provide the

"specific reason or reasons for the adverse determination" but not specifically mentioning
positive benefit determinations (in a provision with the heading "Manner and Content of
Notification of Benefit Determination")).
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unnecessary, thus precluding the inference that covered care is
necessary. In addition, a treating physician who has personally
interacted with the patient is likely to have more information about
the patient's condition and preferences than the patient's MCO. An
MCO that chooses to defer to the treating physician's
recommendation might therefore be conceding the physician's
informational advantage in recommending treatment, rather than
supplying an independent assessment of medical necessity. For this
reason, from a policy perspective, it may not be appropriate to hold
the MCO liable for information provision when it approves
coverage.222 The complexities that these considerations would
introduce into the litigation process, as well as the possibility that the
injured patient could obtain compensation from the treating physician
if the care was indeed substandard, militate in favor of limiting the
applicability of tort liability to information provided during the
course of a negative coverage determination.223
B.

Benefits of a Bifurcated Regulatory Regime

The advantages of this bifurcated regime fall into two general
categories: the benefits of imposing accountability in tort for the
provision of poor quality medical information and the benefits of
retaining the ERISA regime to govern eligibility decisions.
1. Benefits of Imposing Tort Liability
The benefits of holding MCOs accountable in tort for the
provision of medical information mirror those produced by the tort
regime generally. One such benefit is compensation of the injured.
The ERISA regime, as currently structured, fails to provide
compensation to those injured by poor MCO decisionmaking 24 In
contrast, a tort regime would provide compensation to enrollees
injured by an MCO's failure to comply with a medical information
duty.

222. In contrast, when an MCO declares that a physician's recommended treatment is
not medically necessary on the basis of medical or scientific evidence (as opposed to cost
considerations), an enrollee may view the declaration as an assertion that the MCO has
superior information or a superior ability to evaluate information relative to the patient's
treating physician. In this situation, it seems more appropriate to hold the MCO
accountable for the quality of its information provision.
223. As MCOs become more adept in identifying appropriate treatments for
individuals, as opposed to simply determining whether recommended treatments are
inappropriate, this aspect of the bifurcated liability regime should be revisited.
224. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, a tort regime would provide a greater incentive to
health plans to take care in providing medical information to
enrollees. If there were no financial consequences associated with
denying coverage for care, MCOs that focused exclusively on
minimizing costs or maximizing profit would have little reason to be
concerned about erroneous denials. While external review laws and
ERISA do impose financial consequences on MCOs that have
improperly denied care, the financial consequences are limited.225
Suits for improperly denied coverage under these statutes may result
in an order to pay for the requested care. If this is the only sanction
that MCOs face, it may be in their financial self-interest to deny
coverage initially, particularly if only a subset of these denials will
ever be appealed. It is true that MCOs may face other financial
consequences when they deny coverage; denials may increase
litigation-related costs, lead to the loss of customers to competitors
with more generous coverage policies, or result in higher expenses, if
the denials cause injuries that require medical treatment during the
contractual coverage period.
Such consequences are likely to
discourage indiscriminate denials of coverage. By expanding the
magnitude of MCOs' potential liability, however, tort law would
provide an even greater financial incentive to reform coverage
determination processes: MCOs would face full tort liability for
denial-related injuries. They could be liable for treatment costs,
including those incurred after the enrollee's coverage period has
expired, pain and suffering, and lost wages. 2 6 The potential for such
liability would encourage MCOs to provide higher-quality medical
information.
More specifically, the availability of a tort suit based on the
provision of medical information would encourage MCOs to meet the
informational quality standard recognized by law. The shape of this
duty would be determined by state courts, which can take advantage
of the expertise they have developed through their historic

225. External review statutes permit MCO enrollees to appeal adverse coverage
determinations to outside reviewers. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. ERISA
permits employee benefit plan beneficiaries to sue to obtain a benefit for which the MCOs
have improperly denied coverage. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
226. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[olne whose interests of
personality have been tortiously invaded is entitled to recover damages for past or

prospective (a) bodily harm and emotional distress; (b) loss or impairment of earning
capacity; (c) reasonable medical and other expenses; and (d) harm to property or business
caused by the invasion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1979).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

responsibility for determining the contours of similar duties. 2 7 Courts
seeking guidance could consider the tort of misrepresentation; the
information provided should not mislead the enrollee with respect to
the likely outcome of a treatment that has been recommended by a
physician. However, courts are even more likely to draw upon cases
in which patients alleged that by neglecting to properly disclose
information relevant to treatment decisions, their physicians failed to
obtain informed consent.
The information standard applied to MCOs would likely be
somewhat different from and more stringent than that applied to
physicians, however.22 8 Treating physicians typically devote much of
their time to personal interactions with patients, examining them,
performing procedures, or discussing treatment plans in face-to-face
While physicians may be required to describe
conversations.
alternatives to surgical interventions as part of an informed consent
process, because of the nature of the interaction and the time
constraints involved, the amount of information they provide will
tend to be limited. MCOs, on the other hand, often interact with
enrollees through written communication. MCOs can thus provide a
more thorough assessment of the scientific basis (or lack thereof) for
any given recommended treatment. For example, MCOs might be
expected to offer summary statements about the nature of the
evidence, and then provide citations to medical articles or published
medical consensus-based guidelines that provided the foundation for
As previously explained, because of their
their statements.
administrative capabilities and regular interactions with large
numbers of physicians and enrollees, MCOs are well-positioned to
collect, evaluate, and disseminate this kind of medical information.
While both physicians and MCOs are information providers, the tort

227. It would also be possible for Congress to create a federal cause of action for
substandard information provision, enabling enrollees to pursue compensation for their
injuries in federal courts. Requiring such claims to be heard in federal instead of state
court might increase the uniformity of decisionmaking, and might therefore address one of
the concerns underlying ERISA. On the other hand, permitting state tort actions, as
proposed here, allows litigants to take advantage of the existing expertise of state courts in
resolving tort claims. Requiring federal litigation over the quality of information
provision would impose a substantial new burden on federal courts.
228. In advocating malpractice liability for MCOs that practice medicine, Professor
Morreim similarly suggests that the duties of MCOs will differ from the duties of
physicians. See MORREIM, supra note 20, at 124. She explains that while MCOs cannot
perform physicians' hands-on functions, they must seek information from persons who
can. See id. She concludes that "tort litigation will focus heavily on the quality of
evidence and the quality of reasoning behind the plan's decision." Id. at 125.
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law standard should account for the differences in the nature of their
interactions with patients.2 29
A tort law-based standard for information provision may be
important because although ERISA regulations dictate that
information be provided,23 ° they do not and probably cannot
articulate in detail the content or quality of that information. The
availability and nature of relevant medical and scientific information
will vary widely depending on the individual enrollee's condition.
Thus, bright line rules governing the magnitude and nature of
information provision would be difficult to formulate. In areas where
the regulations do not provide specific guidance, the tort standard can
give shape to our expectations about the quality of information to be
provided.
By encouraging the development and provision of high-quality
information, a tort regime could significantly increase the quality of
care that enrollees receive. First, to the extent that improper benefit
denials are a function of poor-quality information gathering by
MCOs, an information provision standard might improve the
mechanics of MCO decisionmaking. If the information provision
standard facilitates the introduction of additional information into the
benefit determination process itself, it may increase the likelihood
that MCOs take full account of the medical risks and benefits of
proposed treatments, resulting in more accurate benefit
determinations. As a result, enrollees may be more likely to obtain
needed care.
Second, regardless of the nature of MCOs' ultimate benefit
determinations, an information standard would reduce the likelihood
that enrollees would be misled by MCOs about the necessity of care
recommended by physicians. An information standard modeled after
the reasonable patient standard sometimes applied in the informed
consent context, for example, would require provision of information
229. Some commentators have gone further in suggesting that MCO utilization review
processes should be reshaped to more closely resemble the interaction between physicians
and patients. William Sage, for example, has suggested that health plans should make "a
serious attempt to identify traditional ethical values associated with healing and build
them into coverage determinations," thus adopting a therapeutic approach to coverage
decisions. Sage, supra note 117, at 629; see also Kathy L. Cerminara, Dealing with Dying:
How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking Last-Chance Therapies (Even When the Answer
Is "No"), 15 HEALTH MATRIX 285, 286-87 (2005) (proposing that "insurers incorporate
interdisciplinary counseling and mediation techniques" into the coverage decisionmaking
process for last-chance therapies, to "help those patients deal with dying in a more
therapeutic way, even when the answer to their pleas for coverage of particular treatments
must be 'no' ").
230. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1) (2004).
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that patients would consider material to their decisions about whether
to adhere to their physicians' recommendations."' By combining this
information with information they glean from the Internet and other
sources, motivated and educated enrollees could make more
informed decisions about which course of care to pursue-even if
they must pay for the care themselves. An enrollee with an employer
that selects a health plan with stringent cost-effectiveness
requirements, for example, may choose to purchase out-of-pocket
care for which the MCO (properly) denies coverage.
Admittedly, many enrollees would find themselves unable to
take full advantage of the information the MCO provides. Millions of
Americans are functionally illiterate; many have difficulty
understanding even their own physicians' instructions.232
Only
enrollees with significant education and time to devote to the task
would be able to understand the medical evidence provided by MCOs
and the reasons for which MCO and treating physician assessments
differed. After all, one reason that patients consult their physicians in
the first place is that they do not possess the necessary information
and training to make treatment decisions on their own. On the other
hand, not every enrollee needs to have the capacity to evaluate the
MCO information for the bifurcated regime to produce substantial
benefits. Enrollees may discuss the information with more informed
friends, family members, or caregivers; even better, they may discuss
it with their own physicians or other physicians in order to reconcile
conflicting views. Even if only a subset of enrollees actually used the
information provided, the fact that the MCO might be held
accountable for informational quality creates an incentive to improve
MCO decisionmaking.2 33

231. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The scope of the
physician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need,
and that need is the information material to the decision."); see also FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 106, § 6-10(b) (describing the reasonable patient standard of disclosure).
232. See Shoou-Yih D. Lee et al., Health Literacy, Social Support, and Health: A
Research Agenda, 58 SOC. Sc. & MED. 1309, 1309 (2004) (summarizing literacy statistics);
see also Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Health Literacy Among Medicare Enrollees in a
Managed Care Organizatiqn,291 JAMA 545, 545 (1999) (finding that more than one-third
of English-speaking and more than one-half of Spanish-speaking survey respondents in a
Medicare MCO had "inadequate or marginal health literacy").
233. The proposed regime would offer a remedy only to persons who were injured as a
result of their reliance on the information the MCO provided. See infra Part IV.C.1
(discussing limitations on the effectiveness of the proposed regime). Nevertheless, the
potential for liability in some cases will give MCOs a greater incentive than they otherwise
would have to improve their information provision to all enrollees.
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Furthermore, even if enrollees did not themselves consider the
information produced during the coverage determination process,
treating physicians might be able to take advantage of the
consolidated source of information. While the MCOs' evaluations
may not always provide physicians with new information-after all,
the MCOs' evaluations would be based on studies conducted or
guidelines conceived by physicians-they may on occasion prove
helpful, particularly for treating physicians who are not specialists in
the relevant field. Higher quality information may thus improve the
treatment of not only an individual enrollee, but also future patients.
As commentators such as E. Haavi Morreim have noted, increased
MCO accountability for their exercise of expertise could improve the
enrollees' quality of care not just through improved MCO coverage
decisions, but also through improved MCO involvement in care.234
2. Benefits of Preserving ERISA Regulation
In enacting ERISA, Congress decided to dictate very little of the
substantive content of health plans.235 Just as the settlors of trusts are
free to determine the nature and size of the trust, employers are free
to determine the nature and generosity of their health plans through
their purchase of existing insurance products or the design of their
own plans. The rules of the plan determine how the employers'
resources are allocated among plan beneficiaries. ERISA protects
beneficiaries not by dictating or second-guessing this resource
allocation, but by providing remedies for those seeking to enforce the
allocation specified by plan terms.236 Congress also decided that plan
enforcement should be regulated primarily by the federal
Department of Labor 237 and the federal courts,238 which would
234. MORREIM, supra note 20, at 144-47 (arguing that health plans' duties of expertise
include setting and overseeing patterns of good care and identifying and responding to
patterns of poor care); see also Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice
Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1935
(advocating MCO liability in part on the basis of "MCOs' ability to use authority both to
influence treatment choice directly and to indirectly affect the quality of physician-

selected care").
235. See MORREIM, supra note 20, at 160-61.
236. See supra note 34 (explaining beneficiary remedies).
237. The Secretary of Labor has the authority to create regulations necessary to
protect employee benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(13), 1135 (2000). At the same time,
ERISA's preemptive effects limit states' abilities to enact their own benefit plan
regulations. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
238. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over most types of civil suits brought to
protect employee benefits, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2000), but state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to suits to recover benefits due under § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Id. Even if the enrollee brings a claim within the scope of § 1132(a)(1)(B) in state court,
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promote uniformity in regulation.
These two decisions assist
employers in limiting the costs of their benefit plans.
Restricting the reach of state tort law to suits based on the
provision of medical information, rather than to suits based on the
coverage decision, the decisionmaking process, or MCO operations as
a whole, ensures that resource allocation decisions continue to be
regulated under ERISA. By doing so, the proposed bifurcated
regime may facilitate plans' ability to take costs into account in their
current decisionmaking processes and may encourage greater use of
cost effectiveness criteria in the future.
Proposals that would permit enrollees to sue their plans under
state tort law for medical necessity-based coverage decisions may not
share these cost-related advantages. As discussed in Part IV.A,
"medical necessity" may be defined partly based on cost-related
criteria. Thus, if a necessity-based benefit determination were to
engender a tort suit, the state court would need to determine liability
based not only on the medical criteria underlying the decision, but
also on the cost criteria underlying the decision. In other words, a
jury might ultimately evaluate the health plans' resource allocation
decisions, as well as their exercise of medical judgment. The jury
entanglement with the necessity determination process as a part of a
tort liability determination stands in contrast to the current regime,
under which allocation decisions are subject to review only under
ERISA.
In theory, juries could be permitted to determine whether plans
have properly applied cost-related criteria, just as they determine
whether a physician has committed malpractice or not. However,
particularly when a patient has allegedly been harmed as a result of a
plan's actions, jurors may find it natural to second-guess resource
allocation decisions. While ERISA permits employers to tailor their
benefit packages as they choose, thus limiting the cost of the benefits
they provide,239 jurors may focus on the physical harm to a particular
however, the defendant will often exercise its right under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) to remove
the case to federal district court. For examples of cases filed in state court that the
defendant then attempted to remove to federal court, see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124
S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2004); Land v. Cigna Healthcare of Fla., 381 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir.

2004); DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,459 (3d Cir. 2003).
239. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 465 & n.30 (noting ERISA's limited substantive
requirements for benefit plans). In addition, ERISA's "deemer clause" has been
interpreted to allow self-insured plans to avoid state regulation of the content of insurance
policies, thus giving self-insuring employers flexibility in designing their insurance plans.
See infra note 294. For an explanation of the deemer clause and its relationship to stateimposed benefit mandates, see Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health
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enrollee resulting from a particular policy, rather than the cost
savings that the policy has produced for all enrollees.24 °
Subjecting the ultimate coverage determinations to an ERISA
regime, rather than state tort law, could help to limit these
problematic effects.24' One potentially relevant argument is that
juries may be more susceptible to hindsight bias than judges. If this
argument is correct, 242 one reason to subject coverage determinations
to ERISA rather than state law is ERISA's more limited use of juries.
ERISA never expressly addresses the availability of jury trials, 243 and
there is some conflict in the courts on this question. 244 But numerous
courts have rejected jury trials after deeming the relief sought under
ERISA to be equitable in nature. 245 Thus, even if equitable remedies

Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 89, 92-98 (2005).
240. See Richard A. Ippolito, Freedom To Contract in Medical Care: HMOs, ERISA
and Pegram v. Herdrich, 9 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (describing jury reactions to
the use of cost criteria in the contexts of medicine and safety devices). In an article
exploring the potential consequences of MCO tort liability for coverage decisions, Gail
Agrawal and Mark Hall express similar concern about court involvement in determining
the reasonableness of resource allocation decisions. See Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall,
What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 235, 289 (2003). They stress "the risks of hindsight bias and the
potential chilling effect on efforts to contain costs" inherent in applying substantive state
law standards to coverage determinations. Id.
241. While observing that "[it is very difficult to determine the empirical truth
regarding coverage law," William Sage notes that a recent empirical study "concludes that
courts are largely sympathetic to cost-containment efforts, especially in ERISA cases."
See Sage, supra note 117, at 612-13. The cited study concluded that its empirical results
"confirm[ed] the conventional wisdom that MCOs will be more vulnerable to liability if
ERISA preemption is weakened," and suggested that "[b]y applying ERISA preemption
expansively .. . courts have protected the growth and development of managed care."
Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy: An Empirical
Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278, 286-87 (2001).
242. It is not clear that judges are able to control hindsight and other biases to a greater
extent than juries. In fact, at least one study has found that judges may be as susceptible
to hindsight bias as others, and suggests that juries have the advantage of being able to
correct for hindsight bias by working together as a group. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816, 827 (2001). The article reports the
results of an experimental study involving 167 federal magistrate judges. It evaluates "five
common cognitive illusions (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness
heuristic, and egocentric biases)," and finds that the judges were less susceptible than
other decisionmakers to only two: framing effects and the representative heuristic. Id. at
778. It also discusses mechanisms for avoiding cognitive biases. Id. at 822-26, 828-29.
243. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 1355.
244. See Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims and
Defenses, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ERISA LITIGATION 56 n.199
(2004).
245. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
stated:
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were eventually determined to encompass make-whole damages,2 46

enrollees' claims for injuries due to improper coverage
determinations under ERISA would likely be heard by judges rather
than juries. To the extent that judges are ultimately better-equipped
to respect the resource allocation decisions made by health plans, this
approach will help to achieve the goals of ERISA.
Relatedly, the ERISA regime would help to limit the
problematic effects of hindsight bias because it mandates the
application of a deferential standard of review when plan

administrators have been given discretionary authority to make
coverage decisions. 24 7 The deferential standard tends to discourage
second-guessing of an administrator's resource allocation decisions.

It therefore helps to preserve employers' flexibility in determining the
scope of benefits provided to employees.
Gail Agrawal and Mark Hall seek to alleviate the hindsight
problem through a different approach, the application of process-

based, rather than substantive, standards of tort liability to MCO
decisionmaking processes. More specifically, they argue that tort
liability for coverage decisions should arise "only if an incorrect
coverage decision was caused by 'defects in the design or

[Tlhis Court now joins its sister circuits and decides that there is no right to a jury
trial in a suit brought to recover ERISA benefits. A persuasive factor in favor of
finding no right to a jury trial is that: "The significance of the [arbitrary and
capricious] standard, while second nature to a judge, is not readily communicated
to jurors."
Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Berry v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985)).
246. See generally Langbein, supra note 35 (arguing that equitable remedies include
make-whole relief).
247. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-15 (1989), the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that benefit denials should necessarily be reviewed
under an arbitrary and capricious standard because ERISA fiduciaries by definition
exercise discretion, id., and instead held that "a denial of benefits challenged under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard," id. at 115. However, the
Court added the caveat that the de novo standard would apply "unless the benefit plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Id. Thus, if the plan administrator is given
discretionary authority, decisions are to be reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious
standard. See also JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 136-38 (describing court review of
coverage decisions). The degree of deference the court gives to a plan administrator
exercising discretionary authority may depend on the court's assessment of whether the
plan administrator has a conflict of interest. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; see also Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 n.15 ("An issue implicated by this case
... is the degree to which a plan provision for unfettered discretion in benefit
determinations guarantees truly deferential review. In Firestone Tire itself, we noted that
review for abuse of discretion would home in on any conflict of interest ....).

2006]

MEDICAL INFORMATION LIABILITY

implementation of the [coverage determination] mechanisms.' 248
This approach, like the medical information approach, helps to
preserve cost-containment mechanisms by limiting second-guessing of
the substance of the decision. However, it may do so at the cost of
sacrificing another of the advantages of ERISA regulation: its
uniformity.
In particular, as previously discussed, one of the goals of ERISA
was to ensure that multistate employers could administer their
ERISA plans uniformly across states. 49
Many aspects of the
coverage determination process, such as the timeframes for
decisionmaking, 25 ° are currently regulated under ERISA. The wider
the scope of liability of health plans for other aspects of their
coverage decisions, however, the more likely they will be subject to
the varied determinations of state courts about the appropriateness of
their decisionmaking processes. While similar criticism could be
lodged against malpractice liability for the provision of medical
information, 251 because the provision of medical information is only
one subset of the coverage determination process, the scope of
liability is necessarily more limited. For this reason, it may be
preferable to allow for medical information-based tort liability while
continuing to preempt suits based on other aspects of the coverage
determination process.
C. Concerns About a Bifurcated Regulatory Regime
1. Potential Limits on the Effectiveness of the Regime
There are a number of reasons to question whether a bifurcated
regulatory regime would actually be able to realize all of its potential
benefits. In particular, while this Article's analysis of the bifurcated
regime suggests that the regime could obtain the compensation and
incentive benefits associated with tort law, this suggestion is premised
on the presumption that enrollees would be able to bring successful
tort claims for substandard medical information provision. Plaintiffenrollees may encounter multiple obstacles, however, in their efforts
to bring a successful tort suit. First, courts may be unwilling to
recognize an informational duty; second, the availability of alternative
mechanisms for information provision may undermine tort claims;
248. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at 289 (quoting Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
249. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
250. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f) (2004).
251. See infra Part IV.C.
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third, MCOs may try to avoid liability through contract; and fourth,
the causation element of the tort claim may not always be satisfied.
Each of these obstacles raises an important concern, but none
ultimately provides a reason to abandon the proposed bifurcated
regulatory regime.
Consider the first potential obstacle, courts' possible lack of
willingness to impose an informational duty on MCOs. While there
have been few examples thus far of courts holding MCOs liable in
tort for their provision of services, a couple of recent cases suggest
that courts are moving in this direction. 2 In Shannon v. McNulty, 253 a
Pennsylvania court reasoned that "[w]here the HMO is providing
health care services rather than merely providing money to pay for
services their conduct should be subject to scrutiny" and held that an
HMO had a duty to ensure that the advice provided by nurses staffing
its emergency phone line was medically reasonable. 4 In Jones v.
Chicago HMO Ltd.,255 which involved a claim that an HMO had
assigned too many patients to a contracting physician, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that an HMO may be liable for institutional
negligence.256
A willingness to recognize MCO duties in general is not
sufficient for proper functioning of the proposed legal regime,
however; courts must be willing to recognize the medical information
duty itself. Shannon and Jones draw on case law holding hospitals
liable for institutional negligence as a basis for imposing duties on
MCOs. 257
A classic formulation of hospitals' legal responsibilities
toward patients describes four duties: (1) a duty to use reasonable
care in maintaining facilities and equipment; (2) "a duty to select and
retain only competent physicians;" (3) a duty to oversee persons
practicing medicine inside the hospital; and (4) a "duty to formulate,
adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care
for the patients. 2 5 8 The first duty relates to the physical facilities
252. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at 237-49.
253. 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
254. Id. at 835-36.
255. 730 N.E.2d 1119 (111. 2000).
256. Id. at 1135.
257. See, e.g., id. at 1128-29 (citing a hospital liability case, Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), in support of its imposition of
institutional liability on an HMO); Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835-36 (citing a hospital liability
case, Thompson v. Nason Hospital,591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), in support of its imposition of
corporate liability on an HMO); see also Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at 241-42
(explaining that courts have "looked to hospital liability cases ... to develop the doctrinal

bases for managed care liability).
258. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,707 (Pa. 1991) (citations omitted).
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used by a patient, rather than medical services provided directly to
the patient. The second and third duties arise from hospitals'
interactions with patients' caregivers, rather than the hospitals'
delivery of medical services. MCOs' medical information duties
would extend beyond these traditional institutional duties, since they
would arise from the MCOs' direct interaction with patients in the
role of an information provider.
Although the fourth duty, like the second and third duties, could
be interpreted to govern hospitals' interactions with medical
professionals, rather than the hospitals' interactions with patients,2 59 it
could also conceivably encompass rules governing direct interactions
between institutions and patients. Thus, tort suit plaintiffs might use
it to establish the existence and nature of MCOs' duties with respect
to information provision.
Furthermore, state legislatures have evidenced a willingness to
extend MCOs' liability beyond their actions as intermediaries to their
actions in the course of making health care coverage and treatment
decisions. At least ten states have passed legislation similar to the
THCLA, which expressly created a right of enrollees to sue their
MCOs based on their MCOs' influence on care.6 0 While cases like
Shannon and Jones emphasize the similarities between MCOs and
hospitals, these statutes underscore the similarities between MCOs
and physicians.261 The extension of tort liability to MCOs based on
information provision is thus less far-fetched than it may seem.
259. See, e.g., Graham v. Barolat, No. Civ. A. 03-2029, 2004 WL 2668579, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 17, 2004) (stating that the plaintiff had alleged that a hospital "breached the
fourth Thompson duty" by failing "to 'properly instruct its agents, servants, workmen,

employees and/or ostensible agents in the procedures for properly evaluating and treating
the Plaintiff' " (citation omitted)).
260. See Kesselheim & Brennan, supra note 25, at 462 n.68; see also Agrawal & Hall,

supra note 240, at 271 ("Since 1997, eleven states have enacted variants of laws that create
a 'right to sue your HMO.' "). State statutes imposing liability on managed care entities
include: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4313
(West, Westlaw through 2005 second special session); and OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6593
(West 2005).
See PATRICIA BUTLER, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION LIABILITY LAWS:

CURRENT STATUS AND EXPERIENCE 11-15 (2001), available at http://www.kff.org/
insurance/upload/Comparison-of-State-Managed-Care-Liability-Laws-Report.pdf

(cataloging MCO liability statutes).
261. Indeed, while state statutes defining the practice of medicine do not typically refer
specifically to the provision of information, they may include the provision of medical
advice. For example, Ohio defines the practice of medicine to include "through the use of
any communication ... advis[ing], recommend[ing] ... for compensation ... a drug or
medicine ... or treatment." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.34(A)(3) (West 2004).

Numerous articles have examined the legal debate over whether utilization review as
practiced by MCO employees constitutes the practice of medicine. See, e.g., Andresen,
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A second potential obstacle to the effectiveness of the proposed
legal regime may be the availability of alternative mechanisms for
obtaining information, such as independent external review. In
Calad- and Davila-like settings, the enrollee often knows that there is
a disagreement between the treating physician and the MCO, and
that further review may be warranted. An enrollee may be able to
avoid injury associated with substandard information by seeking a
review, since a reviewer's disagreement with the MCO's decision
would either add to or correct the information that the MCO supplied
to the enrollee. Alternatively, an enrollee might be able to avoid
injury by bringing an ERISA suit challenging the coverage decision.
To the extent that the litigation process results in substantive
discussion or argument about the justifications for the physician's and
MCO's differing medical necessity determinations, the enrollee may
gain additional information relevant to his or her treatment
decision.262
If the information provided through either type of review
corrects MCO misinformation, then the information initially provided
by the MCO is unlikely to cause injury; either the plaintiff would
suffer no injury, or if the plaintiff did suffer injury, it would stem from
causes other than the MCO's misinformation, so an informationbased tort remedy would be unavailable. 263 If the enrollee declines to
seek review, on the other hand, a state court might limit or refuse to
provide a tort remedy, either on the theory that the enrollee was

supra note 134, passim (analyzing the potential for liability based on utilization review
decisionmaking); Trueman, supra note 134, passim (evaluating the potential for
disciplinary actions and malpractice claims against medical directors based on negligent

utilization review determinations).
262. Alternatively, the enrollee could decline to pursue a formal challenge and instead
seek additional information from his or her treating physician, the MCO, or a third party.
263. In fact, if the enrollee pursues a review, the enrollee demonstrates a significant
doubt about the quality of the MCO's information, compromising his or her ability to

recover damages later by weakening the enrollee's claim of injury causation. Strategicallyminded enrollees might therefore choose not to challenge the decision, preserving the

strength of their future claim by taking action consistent with the information the MCO
provided. The potential payoff of this strategy, however, is limited by the fact that a claim

arises only if the enrollee is injured, an undesirable state of affairs that the enrollee may be
able to avoid entirely by challenging the MCO's coverage determination. For this reason,

enrollees capable of navigating the initial appeals process are likely to do so. In contrast,
less capable enrollees may not pursue appeals, incurring injury as a result. The
combination of appeals determinations and tort verdicts would provide an incentive to
MCOs to produce higher-quality information, reducing the incidence of informationrelated injuries.
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contributorily negligent or on the theory that the enrollee had failed
to mitigate damages. z6
The application of contributory negligence and mitigation
doctrines in the managed care context should be rare, however, for
several reasons. First, enrollees may face a considerable burden in
seeking review of an MCO coverage decision. The enrollees would
likely need to devote a significant amount of time and energy to
learning how to navigate the appeals process during a period in which
they find themselves sufficiently ill to need medical care.265 Enrollees
such as Calad, who would have needed to pursue her appeal from her
hospital bed within a very short time, would find this process
particularly burdensome. While victims of negligence are expected to
bear some of the burden of avoiding injury, the doctrines of
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463-466, 552A (1979) (discussing

contributory negligence); id. § 918(1) (discussing mitigation). For a review of cases
featuring contributory negligence claims in the medical malpractice context, see Kurtis A.
Kemper, Annotation, Contributory Negligence, ComparativeNegligence, or Assumption of
Risk, Other Than Failingto Reveal Medical History or Follow Instructions,As Defense in
Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Medical Malpractice,108 A.L.R. 5th 385 (2005).
The contributory negligence theory would appear better suited to a claim based on an
MCO's utilization review decision than to a standard malpractice claim based on a
physician's recommendation. In the conventional physician treatment context, the patient
has little basis for questioning the physician's recommendation and so should not be
expected to seek a second opinion. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Nugent, 592 A.2d 1126, 1133 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (observing that "a patient is not in a position to ... evaluate whether
the prescribed course of treatment is in her best interest. As a consequence, it is not
contributory negligence for a patient to ... rely on the doctor's advice"). In contrast,
when an MCO makes a negative medical necessity determination, the patient becomes
aware of a conflict between the MCO and the physician. Thus, even if a court would not
preclude recovery by a victim of physician malpractice who failed to seek a second
opinion, a court might consider precluding recovery against an MCO by a patient who
failed to seek external review.
265. Many enrollees begin to learn about the rules of the appeals process only after
care they desire has been denied. According to one survey, two-thirds of California
patients who had actually participated in the independent medical review process were
unaware of the availability of review before becoming involved themselves. JILL K.
SILVERMAN ET AL., INDEPENDENT MEDICAL REVIEW EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA,

PHASE II: CASES INCLUDING MEDICAL NECESSITY 3 (2003), available at http://www.chcf

.org/documents/policy/Phase%2011%20IMR.pdf.

While the patients reported receiving

helpful information about and government assistance with the appeals process, only one-

third reported that the process was clearly explained, and only thirty percent reported
receiving assistance in bringing their case. Id. More generally, factors that might make
external appeals difficult vary by state, but may include requirements to exhaust MCOs'
internal appeals processes before seeking review, filing fees or the fear of filing fees, and
filing deadlines. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., ASSESSING STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW
PROGRAMS AND THE EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION

5-14
(2002),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf
(describing impediments to seeking external reviews and measures states have taken to
address them).
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contributory negligence and mitigation require only reasonable
efforts. 6 6 In some circumstances, the burden of seeking appeals may

exceed the bounds of reasonableness.
Second, and more importantly, given the continuing
improvements in MCO capabilities with respect to the provision of
medical information, it may be inefficient and unreasonable to
require enrollees to continually second-guess MCO information
provision through prospective appeals.26 7 One of the fundamental

functions of tort law is to give potential tortfeasors an incentive to
avoid injuring others; the mere fact that a tort remedy might be
available would reduce the prevalence of injuries by increasing the
quality of information provision. If the overall quality of information

provision significantly improves, whether due to the threat of tort
suits or for other reasons, then frequent enrollee appeals of benefit
denials

would

impose costs

on

all

parties

involved

without

significantly increasing the quality of information. Thus, it may make
sense in the long term not to require enrollees to appeal, but instead
to protect the small number of enrollees who do receive substandard
information through tort remedies. 2"
The third potential obstacle to the application of tort liability to
MCOs' provision of information is the possibility that MCOs would
attempt to avoid any such liability through contract. MCOs such as
those involved in the Davila case often insist that they make only
coverage decisions and that they do not provide medical services. 69
266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (stating that the standard of
conduct for the plaintiff in a negligence case is that of a "reasonable man"); id. § 918(1)
(stating that a tort victim "is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could
have avoided by the use of reasonable effort").
267. In addition, external review may not always be available. Not all states have
adopted external review statutes. Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 466. Moreover,
ERISA's "deemer clause," which precludes the application of state insurance laws to selfinsured plans, may prevent the extension of state-mandated external review to self-insured
plans. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,371 n.6 (2002).
268. Similarly, while it could be argued that victims of improper coverage decisions
should not be able to recover damages in tort for injuries that could have been avoided by
funding their own care, see Leonard A. Nelson, Aetna v. Davila/CIGNA v. Calad: A
Missed Opportunity, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843, 880 (2005) (noting that "it is not
irrational to expect [patients] to mitigate their damages" by seeking care after coverage
has-been denied), a finding of reasonable reliance on an MCO's determination that the
care was not necessary should preclude the application of the mitigation doctrine.
269. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc., supra note 93, at 1 ("They
repeatedly assert that Aetna provided 'medical treatment' to Davila or that Aetna
engaged in 'medical malpractice,' when in fact and law Aetna's role was limited to making
a coverage determination under the ERISA plan."). Aetna also made the common claim
that it could not make treatment decisions because it is not licensed as an entity to practice
medicine. Id. at 3. The lack of a license does not preclude the practice of medicine,
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Aetna's brief to the Supreme Court emphasizes that the plan's
definition of medical necessity is only "[f]or the purpose of
coverage. '270 Moreover, perhaps in an effort to avoid vicarious
liability for the actions of treating physicians, MCOs have often been
careful to clarify in the materials they provide to members that only
independent treating providers, and not the MCOs themselves, make
27 1
treatment decisions.
Thus, an important question is whether an MCO should be
entitled to narrow its scope of potential liability by contractually
disclaiming any duty with respect to the medical content of its
decisions. If so, an enrollee who chose to rely on the medical
information provided through the coverage decision process might be
deemed to assume the risk of poor-quality information. Note,
however, that while physicians may be able to define the outer limits
of their duties by refusing to accept patients or by declining to
practice outside their specialty, they are significantly limited in their
ability to contractually waive liability for malpractice.
Courts
generally resist efforts by both physicians and hospitals to limit tort
liability, often refusing to enforce exculpatory clauses.272 Courts may
similarly be reluctant to allow MCOs to limit liability when the
medical information they provide influences a patient's choice of
care, just as a physician's recommendation would.2 73

however; it simply means that any practice of medicine that does occur is unauthorized.
Yet as Professors Hall and Agrawal note: "In some states, historical precedents banning
corporations from practicing medicine were interpreted as barring MCOs from being held
liable for the delivery of care." Hall & Agrawal, supra note 220, at 138-39.
270. Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc., supra note 62, at 7. The Aetna Certificate
of Coverage says that "[f]or the purpose of coverage, HMO may determine whether any
benefit provided under the Certificate is Medically Necessary." Joint Appendix, supra
note 88, at 54.
271. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at 246.
272. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, § 6-5(e) (describing courts' hostility to
providers' attempts to limit liability contractually); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MORTAL PERIL 372-74 (1997) (analyzing a California Supreme Court decision refusing to
enforce a hospital exculpation clause on the basis of public policy); HAVIGHURST, supra
note 199, at 306 ("[E]xculpatory clauses in provider-patient contracts have been regularly
denied enforcement on public policy grounds."); Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care
and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in
Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 11, 14-15 (1998) (explaining the
mandatory nature of physician duties to patients).
273. Furthermore, a policy prohibiting exculpatory clauses with respect to information
provision could be viewed as extending to a new context the hostility Congress has
expressed toward attempts by ERISA fiduciaries to avoid liability. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1110(a) (2000) ("Except as provided ...any provision in an agreement or instrument
which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility,
obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.").
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A final limitation on the effectiveness of the proposed regime is
that it would not offer a remedy in tort to all who have been harmed
by MCO coverage denials. In particular, an enrollee pursuing a
medical information-based tort action would have to allege that it was
the MCO's provision of medical information, not the financial
consequences of the MCO's decision, that resulted in the enrollee's
injury. This regime would not expand the remedies available to
enrollees who would have liked to follow their physician's treatment
recommendation but did not because their circumstances precluded
financing care themselves or pursuing internal or external appeals to
obtain coverage. The lack of a remedy for such enrollees under both
the current and proposed regimes, and the resulting limitation on
financial consequences for MCOs, dampens the MCOs' incentives to
make proper use of medical information in the decisionmaking
process. Nevertheless, by encouraging the recognition of liability in
situations in which enrollees are harmed by the provision of medical
information of substandard quality, the proposed regime does
increase MCO accountability in general. Some enrollees will have
the financial resources and ability to pursue recommended treatment,
but will decline to do so because of the actions taken by the MCO.
For reasons discussed in Part III, the level of enrollee reliance on
MCOs for information is likely to increase in the future. This regime
offers a remedy to enrollees harmed by their reliance, while at the
same time offering an incentive to MCOs to improve their
information provision processes in such a way as to benefit all
enrollees.
2. Potential Drawbacks of the Regime
An effective bifurcated legal regime would not be without
drawbacks. First, an expansion of tort liability would produce the
incentive benefits commonly associated with tort law, but would also
impose the costs associated with the tort system. 4 In recent years,
the medical malpractice system has been subject to increasing
criticism, both for failing to identify and remedy real malpractice and
While an informationfor allowing frivolous lawsuits to proceed.
based lawsuit against an MCO and a malpractice lawsuit against a
274. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at 261-62 (describing the shortcomings of the
tort system, as part of an evaluation of the risks and benefits of MCO accountability).
275. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED.

283, 285-86 (2004) (commenting on empirical evidence on malpractice claims, including a
study that showed that "[olnly 2 percent of negligent injuries resulted in claims, and only
17 percent of claims appeared to involve a negligent injury").
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physician may differ in focus, they may suffer from the same
Both may require reliance on conflicting expert
shortcomings.
testimony, and both may be decided based on a jury's desire to
compensate a badly injured plaintiff, regardless of negligence.
Moreover, just as malpractice liability increases insurance costs for
physicians, ultimately increasing charges to payers, informational
liability may increase operational costs for MCOs, ultimately
increasing premiums for consumers.276
Second, liability exposure may discourage MCOs from providing
information to enrollees in the first place. If courts only scrutinize the
accuracy of the information that MCOs choose to provide (as
opposed to considering the information they omit), then MCOs can
limit their likelihood of liability by providing minimal information.
There are several ways to limit this potential drawback, however.
First, even if the information standard does not require MCOs to
divulge all information relevant to a necessity determination, courts
may determine that it precludes the omission of information
necessary to ensure that the information provided is not misleading.
Second, a failure to offer sufficient justification of a medical necessity
decision may encourage appeals, a result that MCOs may wish to
avoid. Third, as previously described, regulations under ERISA
require MCOs to justify their negative coverage decisions.277
MCOs might still avoid ERISA's justification requirements,
however, by avoiding the "adverse benefit determinations" that
trigger them. 278 One way to do this is to cover all recommended care,
2 79
which may harm enrollees by causing an increase in insurance costs.
Another way is to discourage the requests or challenges that make

276. Liability exposure may be greater for MCOs than for physicians, given their
deeper pockets and the perhaps greater likelihood of punitive damages. While punitive
damages are rarely awarded in physician malpractice cases, see FURROW ET AL., supra
note 106, § 6-7(a), courts have awarded substantial damages in cases involving MCOs. In
a case involving a woman who had been denied an autologous bone marrow transplant for
breast cancer based on the lack of scientific evidence for the safety and effectiveness of the
procedure, the jury awarded $77 million in punitive damages. See MORREIM, supra note
20, at 41. Later studies showed that the procedure was ineffective. Id. Several cases have
had damage awards approaching $100 million. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 240, at
270.
277. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
278. An "adverse benefit determination" is defined broadly to include "a denial,
reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make payment (in whole or in part)
for, a benefit." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(4) (2004).
279. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 20, at 183 (noting that the threat of liability might
cause MCOs to refrain from influencing medical decisions). This problem would be
mitigated if MCOs were also held liable for providing coverage for unnecessary care.
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For example, MCOs

might

discourage physicians from making initial recommendations for
treatment.2 81 To reduce the likelihood of recommendations of high-

cost care, they might use financial incentives such as compensation
that rises as treatment costs decrease, or disincentives such as the
threat of exclusion from a network or the demotion to a lesspreferred tier in a tiered health plan. If physicians respond to such

incentives, the enrollee may never realize that another treatment
choice is available.2 82 To achieve the full informational potential of
the bifurcated regime, enrollees and/or their physicians must make
claims for the care that they think is appropriate, and MCOs must
then explain why the care is inappropriate.283
There are several limits, however, on MCO attempts to

circumvent information provision requirements through their
influence on physicians. First, treating physicians may resist negative
MCO influences for ethical reasons; the American Medical
Association's code of ethics requires physicians to disclose treatment
options, regardless of the availability of coverage. 84
Second,
280. Calad's Supreme Court brief, for example, indicates that CIGNA never needed to
issue a formal denial, "since Calad did what CIGNA wanted by leaving the hospital early."
Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 8.
281. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, One Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressures and the
Evolution of Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 35 (M.

Gregg Bloche ed., 2003) ("By delegating utilization management to treating physicians
(and motivating them with financial rewards for withholding care), health plans could
avert the risk of liability for negligent denial of benefits."); cf John V. Jacobi, Patients at a
Loss: ProtectingHealth Care Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 705, 757-62 (1997) (discussing circumstances under which an MCO member
will not recognize substandard care because of the absence of a "trigger event" such as a
denial).
282. Nearly a third of respondents to a 1998 survey of physicians reported sometimes,
often, or very often declining to offer useful services because of health plan rules. See
Matthew K. Wynia et al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services Because of Coverage
Restrictions?,22 HEALTH AFF. 190, 193 (2003). Having a significant proportion of income
(at least twenty-five percent) at risk if costs were too high was only a borderline predictor
of this behavior, however; the strongest predictor was receiving patient requests to deceive
health insurers (presumably to obtain coverage).
Id.; see also Joan H. Krause,
Reconceptualizing Informed Consentin an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 261, 265 (1999) (explaining that physicians do not always disclose noncovered
treatments).
283. In addition, for patients to receive the maximum informational benefit from
physicians as well as from MCOs, it is important that physicians be permitted to provide
their honest advice without fear of MCO retaliation. On this issue, see Richard A. Epstein
& Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption,
and Class Actions, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 646-47 (2001).
284. See AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, POLICY E-8.135:

COST

(2002),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8500.html ("If physicians exhaust
CONTAINMENT INVOLVING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN HEALTH CARE PLANS
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physicians who fail to disclose treatment options may face tort

liability themselves.285
Third, while the influence of financial
incentives alone may not transform a physician into an MCO agent,
the greater the magnitude of MCO influence over physician
treatment decisions, the more likely the MCO will be held vicariously
liable for these decisions.
Another way that MCOs can avoid information provision
requirements is by contractually specifying coverage criteria. If an
MCO's coverage decision is based not on an evaluation of medical
evidence, but instead on policy terms expressly excluding coverage of
the recommended treatment, then the decision provides no medical

information to the enrollee requesting the treatment. The MCO
reduces its liability risk because, in such a case, the enrollee could not
possibly have a claim against the MCO for the negligent provision of
medical information. This approach would reduce the informational
benefits of the proposed regime, because an enrollee would not

receive the MCO's assessment of whether the proposed treatment is
medically necessary. If a policy excluded coverage for bariatric
surgery, for example, then the enrollee could rely only on a treating
physician's advice about whether the surgery was needed. On the
other hand, this approach would generate the countervailing benefit
of increased transparency of health plan decisionmaking. Rather
than being subject to the vagaries of medical necessity-based claims
review, prospective enrollees who read the policy terms would know
that bariatric surgery would not be covered.286 They could then
all avenues to secure a formulary exception for a significantly advantageous drug, they are
still obligated to disclose the option of the more beneficial drug to the patient, so that the
patient can consider whether to obtain the medication out-of-plan."); see also AM. MED.
ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, POLICY E-8.053: RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE IN
HEALTH CARE PLAN CONTRACTS (2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/8480.html (referring to "ethical requirements demanding full disclosure of
treatment options regardless of limitations imposed by plan coverage").
285. The patient may have a malpractice claim if the treatment the physician
recommends is inconsistent with the standard of care. Alternatively, if failure to disclose a
relevant treatment option caused a patient to choose another option that injured the
patient, the patient might have a claim based on a lack of informed consent. Furthermore,
at least one court has suggested in dicta that physicians may have a duty to advocate for
patients potentially harmed by coverage decisions: "[T]he physician who complies without
protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment
dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care."
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also MORREIM, supra
note 20, at 94-96 (exploring the nature of physicians' duties to advocate); William M.
Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HouS. L. REV. 1529, 1538, 1545 (1999) (describing
Wickline and the duties of physicians as advocates in coverage disputes).
286. Mark Hall notes that in practice, some, but not all, insurers have begun to exclude
coverage for bariatric surgery. He concludes that "cost considerations remain covert in
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encourage their employer to offer a wider benefit package, purchase
a more comprehensive policy, or set aside additional funds for
uncovered care.287

The magnitude of tort-related increases in premiums, the extent
of MCO efforts to avoid information provision, and the prevalence of
other tort law-related drawbacks will depend on how effectively both

the tort system and the market for health insurance function. If
MCOs understand the minimum standard of care as applied by state
courts, and courts are able to identify accurately compliance with the
standard, MCOs can avoid liability simply by meeting the standard.
There would be no need to resort to elaborate mechanisms to avoid

disclosure of medical information. If purchasers of insurance value
information more than the cost of its production (including the cost
associated with complying with the informational standard), MCOs
would have an incentive to disclose information despite the possibility
2 88
of tort liability.
Furthermore, if tort reform is applied to MCOs as well as to
physicians, and if it proves to be effective, it will reduce the
magnitude of the drawbacks associated with tort liability. For
example, recent federal tort reform proposals have included caps on
289
noneconomic and punitive damages that appear to apply to MCOs.
Such caps would limit MCOs' liability exposure and thus reduce any
associated disincentive to provide medical information.

A third risk of recognizing tort liability deserves mention: tort
liability may impede efforts to realize the fundamental objectives of
medical necessity determinations, rather than being exposed to public scrutiny or
contractual specification." Hall, supra note 193, at 671.
287. On the benefits of contractual specificity, see HAVIGHURST, supra note 199, at
27-28; MORREIM, supra note 20, at 132-33; Sage, supra note 117, at 637.
288. This Article presumes that the value of MCO information provision exceeds its
cost of production. If MCOs' information costs were higher than the benefits that such
information produced, both the proposed tort law-based information disclosure
requirements and current ERISA requirements would be welfare-reducing, and those who
fund the costs of insurance would be unlikely to demand information provision. An
information standard formulated in part based on the costs and benefits of information
provision would reduce the likelihood of such a result. Furthermore, improvements in
information technology and the development of the Internet have likely decreased the
costs of information collection and dissemination, increasing the probability that the value
of such information exceeds its cost.
289. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH)
Act of 2005, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. § 4(b) (2005) (limiting noneconomic damages in health
care lawsuits to $250,000); id. § 7(b)(2) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of
$250,000 or two times the amount of economic damages); id. § 9(7) (defining "health care
lawsuit" to include health care liability claims concerning health care services brought
against a health care organization); id. § 9(10) (defining "health care organization" to
include any person or entity obligated to pay for health benefits under any health plan).
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ERISA by undermining the benefits of ERISA preemption. In
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,290 the Supreme Court reasoned
that
[s]ection 514(a) was intended to ensure that plans and plan
sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law;
the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial
burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or
It is
between States and the Federal Government ....
foreseeable that state courts, exercising their common law
powers, might develop different substantive standards
applicable to the same employer conduct, requiring the
tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of
the law of each jurisdiction.29'
Citing this language, the Fifth Circuit in Corcoran v. United
Healthcare,Inc. 2 suggested that "there is a significant risk that state
liability rules would be applied differently to the conduct of
utilization review companies in different states," and that this
variation would increase the costs of providing such services,
decreasing plan funds available for other purposes.29 3 Similarly, there
is a risk that if states were to impose tort liability for MCOs' provision
of information, the substantive standards would differ. While this
should not cause significant additional administrative difficulties for
employers that purchase health insurance packages directly from
insurers-these packages are already subject to varying state
statutory requirements under ERISA's "savings" clause exception to
preemption-variable state standards could in theory increase the
complexity of administering a multistate self-insured health plan.294
The courts' discussions of the uniformity issue do not detail the
nature of the complexities that would result from variation in state

290. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
291. Id. at 142.
292. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
293. Id. at 1333.
294. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("Nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance .... "). This savings clause provision allows states to mandate

benefits in insurance packages and to impose other requirements on insurers. Under the
"deemer" clause, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), however, these
regulations may not be applied to self-insured benefit plans. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733, 744 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
mandating the inclusion of mentdl health benefits in insurance contracts is not ERISApreempted and discussing the roles of the savings and deemer clauses).
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permitted to enact statutes regulating
decisionmaking process, the potential for
example, one state might require a decision
within ten days. As Professors Jacobson
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If states were

the structure of the
variation is clear. For
within five days, another
and Pomfret point out,

however, variation in state standards need not preclude uniformity in
health plans.296 As long as requirements do not conflict, a plan can
satisfy them all by complying with the strictest requirement. A plan

that faced a five-day requirement in some states and a ten-day
requirement in others could simply make all of its decisions
nationwide within five days. If a direct conflict in requirements
imposed by states did arise, Congress could remedy the conflict by
creating a federal regulation that preempts state law with regard to

the specific issue in question.
Furthermore, there is unlikely to be significant variation in state
common law substantive standards for the MCO provision of medical
information, and it is difficult to imagine a scenario under which
standards regulating informational quality would directly conflict.297
Courts have increasingly abandoned local custom-based standards of

care for physicians in favor of national standards, particularly for
specialists.2 98 Similarly, courts should recognize a national standard of

care for MCO information provision, and would likely do so. The
medical research that would supply the basis for MCOs' coverage
decisions would often be publicly available nationwide, and many

MCOs themselves are national in scope. For this reason, variation
among state tort decisions is unlikely to exceed substantially variation

among decisions within a federal system. To the extent that such
variation does arise, the Department of Labor could expand its

rulemaking to respond to it.

295. For example, in Ingersoll-Rand, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the
possibility of "different substantive standards applicable to the same employer conduct,"
but did not provide hypothetical or actual examples of such standards. See Ingersoll-Rand,
498 U.S. at 142. Similarly, in Corcoran,the Fifth Circuit refers to the "significant risk that
state liability rules would be applied differently to the conduct of utilization review
companies in different states," but does not describe the nature of any such differences in
application. See Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1333.
296. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 119, at 1066.
297. See Jordan, supra note 6, at 444-45 (arguing that differences in substantive state
law standards are unlikely to hinder interstate administration of ERISA plans).
298. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, § 6-2. See generally Jacobson & Pomfret,
supra note 119, at 1065-68 (discounting the lack-of-uniformity argument as a justification
for ERISA preemption of claims based on utilization review, in part because of
increasingly national standards of care).
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Thus, while there may be drawbacks to imposing tort liability for
medical information provision, they are generally limited in
magnitude and can be addressed through a variety of means. The
benefits of imposing liability are likely to outweigh these drawbacks.
CONCLUSION

Increasing health care costs have prompted a resurgence of
interest
in traditional
techniques
for
managing
care.299
Pharmaceutical "step therapy" of the sort at issue in the Davila case,
which requires patients to first try less expensive drugs before trying
more expensive drugs, is still required by the health plans of millions
of Americans; one pharmacy benefit manager reports that the use of
step therapy has nearly tripled among its clients in the last three
years.3" Utilization review nurses, such as the one who played a role
in Calad's case, continue to monitor hospital care.3" 1 A number of
health plans that had eliminated prior authorization requirements in
the wake of the managed care backlash reinstituted at least some of
them after health care utilization levels began to rise rapidly.3 2 While
MCO requirements on the whole may be less restrictive than they
once were,30 3 they nonetheless will continue to provoke controversy
among patient-enrollees and treating physicians.
Denials of coverage for care that would improve the health of
enrollees can have serious long-term consequences. Regardless of
whether the denials are improper or proper, and regardless of
whether they are based on medical judgment, they can effectively
deny care for enrollees who do not themselves have the funds to pay
for care. But denials of coverage that entail the communication of
incorrect medical information may have an additional effect: they
299. See, e.g.,
SYS. REFORM,
RESPONSIBILITY

DEBRA A. DRAPER & GARY CLAXTON, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH
MANAGED CARE REDUX:
MANAGED CARE PLANS SHIFT
TO CONSUMERS, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 79, 1-2 (2004), available at

http://hschange.org/CONTENT/666/666.pdf (explaining that sharp increases in utilization
have led to the reimposition of certain managed care controls).
300. Martinez, supra note 182.
301. Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-430; see also Robert Kazel, Tightening the
Leash: Managed Care Hassle Factors Getting Bigger, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 18, 2004

(stating that some "health plans have increased the presence of utilization review nurses
working inside hospitals, in part to facilitate earlier discharges").
302. Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-429 to -30. Some plans have introduced
preauthorization requirements for imaging procedures. See, e.g., Jeffrey Krasner, Blue
Cross to Require Preapprovalfor Scans, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2005, at C1 (reporting

that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts planned to impose such authorization
requirements).
303. Mays et al., supra note 152, at W4-429 to -30.
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may discourage enrollees, whether financially constrained or not,
from seeking needed care. While an informational influence on
enrollees may seem unlikely in a climate characterized by distrust of
MCOs, the more significant the role, that. MCOs begin to play in
information collection, processing, and dissemination, the more that
enrollees will-and should-rely on MCOs' information provision.
The goal of tort liability would be to hold MCOs accountable for the
quality of this information provision.
A bifurcated legal regime will not benefit every enrollee harmed
by improper MCO adverse benefit determinations. An MCO may
make an improper benefit determination but nonetheless comply with
the standard for information provision. Alternatively, evidence may
suggest that an enrollee has failed to pursue a recommended course
of treatment not because of poor information but instead solely
because of a lack of funds. In neither case would the bifurcated
regime offer individual enrollees an improvement over the current
ERISA-based regulatory regime. It is not clear, for example, whether
either Davila or Calad would benefit from this system. Additional
reforms therefore may prove useful. Reforms that improve access to
and increase the use of external review mechanisms and ERISA
litigation would help prevent injuries due to both poor information
and financial constraints.
In addition, extending the remedies
available under ERISA to include consequential damages would
increase MCOs' incentives to prevent injury to enrollees while at the
same time supplying a remedy for injuries that do occur.
Congressional attempts to expand ERISA liability, however, have
failed repeatedly.
A more incremental approach may meet with greater success.
Subjecting information provision to state tort liability would provide
an incentive to improve informational quality, while continued
ERISA regulation of coverage determinations would preserve the
viability of cost-based coverage criteria. A federal statute creating a
bifurcated legal regime would benefit future enrollees who want to
make informed choices about the care they receive. It would thus be
an appropriate legal innovation for an era of consumer-driven health
care.

